Three Essays On Law And Development In Mexico by Balmori De La Miyar, Jose Roberto
THREE ESSAYS ON LAW AND DEVELOPMENT IN
MEXICO
A Dissertation
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of Cornell University
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
by
José Roberto Balmori de la Miyar
May 2014
© 2014 José Roberto Balmori de la Miyar
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
THREE ESSAYS ON LAW AND DEVELOPMENT IN MEXICO
José Roberto Balmori de la Miyar, Ph.D.
Cornell University 2014
This dissertation provides empirical evidence on the causal relationship between the rule of
law and economic development in both directions, taking Mexico as a case study. The first chapter
examines the effect of Oportunidades, Mexico’s flagship social program, on reporting violence
against women to the police. I use specialized survey data to estimate the average treatment effect
of additional reports to the police for women who experienced spousal abuse prior to participating
in the program. The identification strategy for this chapter consists of two instrumental variables
that are based on institutional characteristics of Oportunidades. Findings indicate an increase of
30.2% in the reporting rates as a consequence of receiving Oportunidades. The causality channels
include assimilation of women’s rights, increasing trust in the police, and changes in the marriage
market.
Large-scale military conflicts oftentimes disrupt economic development. The second chapter
studies the case of the Mexican Drug War for treated states, employing synthetic control methods.
To prove causality systematically, I use variation on statewide military operations conducted by the
Mexican Army, and the rollout of the war. Findings indicate a decrease in GDP per capita equal
to 0.5%. Determinants by which the Mexican Drug War hampered economic development include
a proportional reduction in consumption per capita, and a decline in productive investment of at
least 0.3%, driven by a drop of 3.2% in commercial credit granted to businesses.
The thrid chapter analyzes the effect of drug-related violence on depression among adults in
Mexico during Mexican Drug War. The empirical strategy consists of first-differences in aggregate
health outcomes at the municipality level before and after the beginning of the conflict. To account
for potential migration biases, I use variation on net cocaine supply from Colombia and on federal-
local enforcement cooperation. Results suggest an increase of 1.0% in depression among women,
for every additional one-standard deviation expansion in drug-related homicide rates. In stark
contrast, Mexican men seem largely unaffected by drug-related violence.
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1 THE EFFECT OF OPORTUNIDADES ON REPORTING
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN TO THE POLICE
New national statistics, gathered by the Mexican Women’s Institute, point to a hostile environ-
ment for women living in Mexico. As of 2006, one in every four Mexican women has, at some
point in her marital life, experienced physical or sexual intimate partner violence (IPV), the termi-
nology used in the criminology literature to refer to violence against women at the household level
(ENDIREH, 2006).1 Compared with other countries, Mexico usually lags behind or at best ranks
in the middle part of the world on issues related to IPV (UN, 2010).
Worse yet, Mexican women rarely report IPV to the police, even though IPV is a crime in Mex-
ico. Only two in ten physically or sexually abused women ever seek help from the Mexican justice
system (ENDIREH, 2006).2 To place this under-reporting situation in perspective, Mexico per-
forms far behind the United States, where “[a]pproximately 60% of family violence victimizations
were reported to the police between 1998 and 2002” (Durose, 2005; p.6).
This could be a mere reflection of poor institutional quality in the Mexican police departments
(e.g. Ministerios Públicos). However, roughly seven in ten women who do report IPV to the
police claim having received “good attention and orientation” from them (ENDIREH, 2006). Far
from being perfect, the quality of institutional services can hardly be the main reason for under-
utilization of the justice system by abused women in Mexico.
Furthermore, reporting IPV to the police seems to work well in terms of reducing subsequent
IPV. Over 65% of women who do report IPV to the police claim that, after having used the justice
system, IPV stopped or diminished (ENDIREH, 2006). Hence, reporting IPV to the police is a
good strategy for abused women on average.
So if not institutional quality and subsequent outcomes, what exactly keeps abused women
from reporting IPV to the police in Mexico? When asked this question, seven out of ten physically
1The victimization rate increases to 50% of the total married or separated women population when including all
types of IPV.
2Empirical evidence shows that women who only experience emotional and economic IPV do not report IPV to
the police (ENDIREH, 2006). See Table 1.1 below.
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or sexually abused women identify social norms —shame, family rejection, children’s future and
personal disregard to women’s rights— as the main reason for not reporting IPV to the police
(ENDIREH, 2006). Likewise, two in every ten physically or sexually abused women claim fear of
possible retaliation by their abusive partners (ENDIREH, 2006).
Broadly speaking, social norms substitute for the rule of law on issues related to IPV in Mexico.
A deeply conservative society, in which male chauvinism prevails, pushes Mexican women to lose
their basic human rights for all practical purposes. In other words, ostracism costs are too great for
Mexican abused women to overcome.
The absence of the rule of law, for IPV issues or any other matter, hampers economic growth
(Knack and Keefer, 1995; Barro, 2003). For instance, studies in Latin American countries (e.g.
Chile and Nicaragua) estimate an economic cost of male-to-female IPV close to two percent of the
national GDP (Morrison and Orlando, 1999). Therefore, establishing the rule of law and incen-
tivizing women to preserve their basic human rights and productivity are of extreme importance,
economically speaking.
This chapter examines whether social programs targeted to Mexican women —with the purpose
of empowering them and improving their socio-economic status— incentivizes abused women to
report IPV to the police. In particular, I examine the case of a conditional cash transfer (CTT)
program in Mexico that has been imported by several countries around the world (e.g. Brazil,
Peru, USA). The name of this program is Oportunidades (e.g. Opportunities), and it is Mexico’s
flagship social program.
To estimate the effects of Oportunidades on reporting IPV to the police, I use the 2006 wave of
the Mexican National Survey of Relationships within the Household (ENDIREH-06). The survey
contains a detailed IPV section with dates, frequency, and severity of IPV, as well as information
about the last IPV report to the police, if any. The data also provides economic and demographic
indicators, which lets me identify the population eligible for Oportunidades: the “poor”. To do
so, I strictly follow the poverty definition used in the program. Most important, ENDIREH-06
contains information about current recipient status for Oportunidades.
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However, one complication arises from this exercise: —I expect changes in IPV as a con-
sequence of receiving Oportunidades. My expectations are based on an existing literature that
explores the effects of CCTs on IPV. For the case of Oportunidades in Mexico, Angelucci (2008)
finds aggressive behavior to diminish by 37% among rural recipients receiving a small transfer, but
negative side effects (30% increase in IPV) among rural beneficiaries receiving larger transfers.3
Similarly, Bobonis, González-Brenes and Castro (2013) estimate a 40% decrease in physical IPV
among rural Oportunidades beneficiaries, although a significant increase in violent threats. Last,
Bobonis and Castro (2010) find no influence of Oportunidades on IPV among rural beneficiaries in
the long run. Other studies in Latin America include Peru, where Perova (2010) finds a reduction
in emotional and physical IPV for “Juntos” beneficiaries equal to 11% and 9%, respectively.
Whereas “extractive-private information models” match the existing evidence of changes in
IPV as a consequence of CCTs in Mexico, “bargaining models” do so for CCTs in Peru. The
former set of models predicts changes in the costs of violence threats for extractive purposes (Bloch
and Rao, 2002; Bobonis et al., 2013).4 Conversely, the latter theories suggest shifts in the woman’s
reservation utility (Tauchen, Dryden Witte and Long, 1991; Farmer and Tiefenthaler, 1996).
Based on the evidence by Angelucci (2008) and Bobonis et al. (2013), I control for potential
negative changes in IPV —as in the extractive-private information models— among some benefi-
ciaries. Therefore, I limit my sample to only those women who experienced IPV prior to receiving
Oportunidades. Moreover, I exclude all women who identify Oportunidades as a cause for an
increase in IPV, based on information from my data.
In all, the research design for this chapter consists in comparing treated “poor”, prior-to-
treatment abused women with control “poor”, abused women. Nonetheless, there are further po-
tential self-selection problems —attrition or take-up of the program— arising from this inferential
3Angelucci (2008) uses an evaluation survey with a sample drawn from 506 villages in 7 different states. The
questions asked for her data are the following: “[w]ho is (are) the individual(s) who drinks the most in this household,
irrespective of the frequency?” and “[w]hile drinking, does this person (referred to the heaviest drinker) have an
aggressive behavior?” Rural recipients receiving a small transfer account for 40% of Angelucci’s (2008) total sample.
4“Extractive-private information models” assume private information on gains to marriage for men and a preference
for marriage over separation for women. Both of these assumptions are conducive to men extracting rents from women.
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exercise.5 Hence, my identification strategy suggests two instrumental variables (IV) to solve for
omitted variable biases. The first of my instruments exploits drop out variation in rural and semi-
rural communities caused by the type of hospital available in any given community (e.g. federal
versus state-run) to solve for attrition. The second instrument uses the roll-out in the densifica-
tion process for urban and semi-urban communities to account for take-up of the program in these
areas.
After dealing with all possible biases, findings indicate a positive effect of Oportunidades on
reporting IPV to the police. Namely, treated “poor”, prior-to-treatment abused women are 4.2%
more likely than the equivalent control group to report IPV to the police. In relative terms, this is
an increase of 30.2% in the reports of IPV to the police. In order to explore the mechanisms of
causality, I propose several channels through which treatment might work into the final outcome:
i) assimilation of women’s rights (25.8%); ii) an increase of trust in the police (13.8%); and iii)
a new equilibrium in the marriage market in which more future dissolutions (27.7%) and fewer
reconciliations (18.1%) occur among abused beneficiary women.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 1 describes Oportunidades, briefly. Section 2 lays the
foundations for the empirical design. In section 3, I propose an identification strategy to deal with
self-selection biases. Section 4 presents the results and robustness checks. Section 5 analyzes the




Ernesto Zedillo’s administration initiated Oportunidades, formerly Progresa, in August 1997. The
program aims at eliminating the cycle of poverty through health, nutrition, and education in areas
where these human capital investments are lacking. In particular, Oportunidades provides the
woman of the household a cash transfer for complying with specific requirements. This gender-
5ENDIREH-06 is a cross-sectional survey and is thus not able to identify every woman who received the program
in the past.
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targeting satisfies an additional goal of Oportunidades: women’s empowerment.6 At the same
time, it reduces the likelihood of private spending as opposed to household spending because
women are generally more altruistic than men in “poor” Mexican households (Benería and Roldán,
1987; SEDESOL, 2000; Wooley, 2004; Bobonis et al., 2013).
The cash transfer contains two separate monetary components —a food grant and a school
scholarship.7 Each of the monetary components has an “independent conditionality requirement:
[...] The food grant, which is the same amount for each beneficiary household, is conditional on
health check-ups for all family members and on attendance by the recipient at public health lectures
[pláticas]” (Álvarez, Devoto and Winters, 2008; pp. 643). Every other month, Oportunidades staff
gather health check-up and pláticas attendance records from healthcare providers. Failure to meet
these requirements causes administrators to drop non-compliant household from the program.8
Unlike food grant, the scholarship amount varies by school grade and gender of eligible children
in the household, and is conditional on maintaining an attendance rate greater than or equal to 85%.
“If attendance requirements are not met, the amount linked to that particular child is deducted from
the bimonthly total payment to the family” (Álvarez et al., 2008; p. 643).9
According to Skoufias (2005), beneficiary households receive, on average, about 20% of their
income through Oportunidades (Table A.1 provides the 2005 formula for the monetary compo-
nents).10 Moreover, since the inception of Oportunidades, its creators have been careful to keep
the program apolitical. Hence, cash transfers have been handed out by public financial companies
6Only in cases where all adult women in the household are permanently absent can beneficiaries be male. “Male
recipients represent less than 10% of the recipient population” (Álvarez et al., 2008).
7Oportunidades provides the cash transfer on a bimonthly basis (SEDESOL, 2000). Oportunidades also provides
a health component consisting of free preventive health courses, free nutritional supplements for children under 5 and
pregnant women, and free medical check-ups (Samano, 2010).
8If a household fails to meet health check-ups and pláticas conditionality requirements “for 4 consecutive months
(2 bimonthly periods) or for 6 non-consecutive months out of any 12 months (3 bimonthly periods out of six),” then
the system drops this household out of the program (Álvarez et al., 2008; pp. 643).
9“Failure to meet the conditions associated with children’s schooling [...] does not result in expulsion from the
program but rather in a reduced payment” (Álvarez et al., 2008; pp. 643).
10The cash entitlement depends on the demographic characteristics of the family. For example, in 2005, an eligible
family with a boy in 3rd grade and a girl in 10th grade received a monthly cash transfer of $930 MXN, which is
approximately $80 US dollars. In 2005, the maximum transfer allowed per family was $1775 MXN. Consequently,
“[l]arger households potentially receive more money,” but only up to the cap set by the rules of Oportunidades (Álvarez
et al., 2008; pp. 650). Administrators revise the formula twice a year to determine the amount of aid with respect to
changes in the Mexican CPI (inflation).
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in rural areas and by the private commercial bank in urban areas (Hevia de la Jara, 2009).
1.1.2 Beneficiary Selection
The process for selecting beneficiaries consisted of three different stages. First, administrators
chose a community based on population, a marginality index,11 and access to health and educa-
tional services (SEDESOL, 2000).12 At first, the government gave priority to the most marginal
rural communities —localities with fewer than 2,500 inhabitants— and semi-rural communities
—localities with a total population between 2,499 and 15,000 inhabitants, hereinafter rural ar-
eas.13 Five years into the operation of the program, the government also incorporated semi-urban
communities —localities with more than 14,999 inhabitants but fewer than 50,000 inhabitants—
and urbanized communities —localities with 50,000 inhabitants or more, hereinafter urban areas.
Second, once a locality was eligible, staff members conducted a household survey to gather
economic and demographic information, used to construct a discriminant score (puntaje). This
discriminant score differentiated the “poor” from the “non-poor”. For rural areas, the survey was
applied to all (100%) households. Thus, the take-up rate in rural areas was around 97% (Angelucci
and Attanasio, 2009). In stark contrast, households living urban areas had to sign up at registration
offices (módulos) during a registration period. Once a household was registered, Oportunidades
staff conducted a household survey. Because of this, the take-up rate in urban areas was much
lower. About 40% of eligible urban households did not apply for the program (Behrman et al.,
2012).
Finally, the third stage of the selection process consisted in incorporating eligible households
into the program. At this stage, staff members contacted the woman of the household to give her
an identification and inscription forms to take to the healthcare provider and designated school
11This marginality index contained the proportion of illiterate population, the proportion of adults working in the
agricultural sector, and the proportion of houses without access to water, without a sewage system, without electricity,
or with dirt flooring.
12This accessibility feature required that a chosen community had a school and clinic either in the locality or
through an accessible road within a radius of 10 km for federal roads, 6 km for state roads, or 2 km for unpaved roads
(SEDESOL, 1999).
13Administrators implemented the program in those communities with scores 4 and 5 from a scale of 1 to 5, from
less marginal to more marginal.
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(SEDESOL, 1999). In December 2004, Oportunidades reached its original goal of expanding the
program to every state in Mexico and benefiting 5 million vulnerable Mexican families (Samano,
2010).
1.2 Empirical Design
The main purpose of this chapter is to estimate the average treatment effect (ATE) of Oportunidades
on reporting IPV to the police. Both, the treatment and outcome variables are binary. Therefore,
the central probit model I estimate is the following:
P(Report)i = α+βTi +θXi + εi, (1.1)
where Report takes the value 1 if abused woman i reports IPV to the police; T is equal to 1 if
abused woman i is currently receiving Oportunidades; X represents a subset of observable controls;
and ε indicates other unobservables that influence the outcome. The parameter of interest —the
ATE of Oportunidades on reporting IPV to the police— is β . In theory, equation (1.1) provides the
true value of β as long as T is uncorrelated with ε .
1.2.1 Data
I calculate the effect of Oportunidades on reporting IPV to the police using the 2006 wave of the
Mexican National Survey of Relationships within the Household (ENDIREH-06). The Mexican
Institute for Women conducted ENDIREH-06 between October and November 2006. Respondents
were 113,561 women older than 15 years of age.14
The survey gathers economic and demographic characteristics of the chosen woman, her (ex)
spouse, and other household members. ENDIREH-06 also contains a section about IPV with
detailed information on dates, frequency, and severity of IPV.15 Table A.2 reports the questions
14A special feature about ENDIREH-06 is that all interviewers were women who conducted the survey while the
spouse, if any, was away. ENDIREH-06 surveyed only one eligible woman per household. What is more, ENDIREH-
06 classified the surveyed women into three groups, i) single, ii) divorced or separated, and iii) married or cohabiting.
15For obvious reasons, the IPV section is only available for women who are either married, cohabiting, or separated.
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included in the survey’s IPV section. I assign the standard IPV classification from the sociology
literature —physical, emotional, sexual, or patrimonial IPV— to each of the questions in the IPV
section (Coker et al., 2000; Ellsberg et al., 2001).
Moreover, the survey indicates whether an abused woman has ever reported IPV to the police as
well as the year and month of the last report. Specifically, the question asks: “After experiencing
aggressions from your [ex] husband, have you gone to ... 1) the police, 2) the public ministry,
3) other authority, 4) none of the above?” I consider any of the first three options to be positive
outcomes (e.g. Report takes the value 1).16
Most important, ENDIREH-06 provides information about current recipient status for Oportu-
nidades and the number of years that the respondent has been receiving the program, if currently
enrolled. Thus, participation is self-reported and not pre-determined by the survey’s planners.
Still, the correlation between the proportion of self-reported beneficiaries in ENDIREH-06 and the
official Oportunidades data at the municipality level is 0.905, suggesting an accurate representation
of the actual set of beneficiaries.
In addition to ENDIREH-06, I use the 2004 United Nations Mexican Municipalities Human
Development Index (MxIDH) to control for local characteristics. The MxIDH contains two main
development indexes: the Human Development Index (IDH) and the Gender Empowerment Index
(IPG). Specifically, IDH gathers information on life expectancy, education, and per capita income.
On the other hand, IPG summarizes three different gender-gap components: political participation
empowerment, economic participation empowerment, and economic resources empowerment.17
Therefore, the sample excludes all single women, leaving a potential sample of 95,615 women.
16This is because, in the Mexican justice system, all three authorities belong to the same structure and, thus, should
lead to the same outcome.
17MxIDH defines political participation as the proportion of women occupying a parliamentary position; economic
participation as the percentage of women who are parliamentarians, appointed political bureaucrats, or executive
directors in a company; and economic resources empowerment as the income earned by women in comparison to
men.
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1.2.2 Constructing a Control Group
To build a comparable control group, I complement the data above with external sources to produce
the discriminant score (puntaje) used in the second stage of the beneficiary-selection process (see
section 1.2). This allows me to identify eligible women who are not current recipients of Opor-
tunidades and who could thus serve as good counter-factuals. I do so following the same poverty
definition and information used by administrators of Oportunidades, based on the following vari-
ables (Hernández Franco, Corona, and Baez, 2008):
1. House characteristics: located in a rural community, dirt floor, drainage, availability of toilet
but without running water, overcrowding index, and ownership of a gas stove, a refrigerator,
a washer machine, and a motorized vehicle.
2. Household characteristics: Gender, age, and education of the head of the household; depen-
dency index; access to employer’s health insurance; and number of children under the age
of 12.
3. Regional characteristics: 14 different regions based on household spending and administra-
tive data from Oportunidades.
However, the weights assigned to each of these variables are confidential to avoid any misuses of
the program. A way around this secrecy is to estimate the weights using the household surveys
conducted during the selection process: ENCASEH and ENCALURB. Public access to both of
these surveys, which contain all the above variables and the discriminant scores, allows me to
construct the respective variables’ weights. As expected, the linear model including the variables
above is extremely significant (e.g. F-statistic above 100,000) and explains 99% of the variation
on puntaje for both surveys.
Most important, ENDIREH-06 provides information about all the variables used to estimate
the discriminant score.18 Therefore, I am able to predict the puntaje for my sample by interacting
18With the exception of the ownership of a gas stove, which I proxy using access to gas or piped water in a house.
The logic for the latter proxy is that houses with access to water are more likely to have gas delivered.
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the information provided in ENDIREH-06 with the estimated weights obtained from ENCASEH
and ENCALURB. As a caveat, puntaje and severity of poverty move in the same direction.
Figure 1.1: Box Plot: Discriminant Score (Puntaje)
Figure 1.1 presents the estimated puntaje for ENDIREH-06. The thicker, solid line in both
panels of Figure 1.1 represents the discriminant score (0.69) between the “poor” and the “non-
poor” at the time of selection. Any household at or above the threshold is “poor” and thus eligible
to receive Oportunidades. Likewise, the thicker, dashed line shows the discriminant score (0.383)
between the “poor” and the “non-poor” for households already in the roster, which is the threshold
for transitioning into graduation from the program.
The left panel in Figure 1.1 contains the puntaje for women living in rural areas. Clearly, ben-
eficiaries have a higher puntaje than non-beneficiaries (e.g. beneficiaries are “poorer”). Moreover,
the data show very little economic mobility among rural beneficiaries. Only 11% of current rural
recipient women do not meet the poverty discriminant score for beneficiaries (0.383), making them
technically non-eligible for the program in the next re-evaluation. This distribution matches the
findings of Campos Vazquez, Chiapa, and Santillán (2012), who report that 90% of rural families
on the roster continue to be eligible for all components of Oportunidades after the first two revalu-
ations conducted every two to three years. Conversely, about 30% of rural non-beneficiary women
are eligible to enter Oportunidades (errors of exclusion), and close to 50% of rural non-beneficiary
women meet the poverty discriminant score for beneficiaries (puntaje higher than 0.383).
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Similarly, the right panel in Figure 1.1 depicts the estimated puntaje distribution for women
living in urban areas. The results also show a pronounced separation between the “poor” and
the “non-poor”. However, this panel shows a faster economic mobility among urban beneficiary
women. That degree of mobility is exactly what Campos Vazquez et al. (2012) find: 28% of the
urban recipients have lower puntaje during each of the re-certification processes and only 59% of
all urban beneficiaries continue to be “poor” after the first two revaluations. This is a slightly higher
proportion than that depicted in the right panel of Figure 1.1, which is approximately 52%.19
1.2.3 Sample
First and foremost, the sample includes only those women who are eligible or marginally ineligi-
ble for the program. Specifically, I use the transition cutoff score (0.383) to distinguish between
“poor” and “non-poor” women (dashed line in Figure 1.1). Therefore, I estimate the effects of
Oportunidades on reporting IPV, conditional on being “poor”. This restriction reduces the sam-
ple to those who participate the most. Also, this condition minimizes the distance in the differ-
ences on observables and, hopefully, on unobservables. Even though the sample includes some
marginally ineligible non-beneficiary women, this threshold also keeps more current beneficiaries
in the sample than if I were to use the selection cutoff (0.69), because of economic mobility among
beneficiaries.20
Second, I only keep those women who claim having ever experienced physical or sexual IPV.
This restriction follows extensive evidence showing that only these types of IPV are ever reported.
Table 1.1 presents the rates of ever experiencing IPV and the rates of reporting IPV to the police
(conditional on ever experiencing IPV) by type and area, for the whole sample (first column)
and for the “poor” sample, separately. The last row in Table 1.1 shows that women who only
experience emotional and economic IPV do not report it to the police, irrespective of poverty
19The focalization on the selection process of beneficiaries results in having some errors of exclusion for rural
households and some errors of inclusion for urban households. Mainly, this is because much of the poor population in
Mexico lives in rural areas as opposed to urban areas.
20This lower threshold allows me to accommodate some measurement error in the estimated puntaje. In addition,
I use the predicted puntaje together with the standard errors to further account for potential mispredictions. Standard
errors are, on average, only 0.04 points.
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conditions. Based on the “severity” of IPV, this is exactly what the criminology literature would
predict (Black, 1976; Felson et al, 2002; Thompson and Kingree, 2006). What is more, Table 1.1
also shows higher rates of physical or sexual IPV among “poor” women, particularly for those
living in urban areas. Hence, this restriction maintains a relevant sample.
Table 1.1: IPV Rates and Rates of Reporting IPV to the Police
Conditional on being “poor”*
All “poor” & All “poor” Rural “poor” Urban “poor”
“non-poor”* Non-B Benef Non-B Benef Non-B Benef
Never-IPV 0.51 0.48 0.54 0.54 0.56 0.39 0.39
Ever Emotional (Low) IPV 0.4 0.42 0.36 0.37 0.35 0.52 0.51
Ever Emotional (High) IPV 0.21 0.24 0.21 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.33
Ever Economic IPV 0.31 0.33 0.27 0.28 0.25 0.42 0.43
Ever Sexual IPV 0.1 0.11 0.11 0.1 0.11 0.13 0.15
Ever Physical IPV 0.24 0.28 0.26 0.24 0.24 0.33 0.37
Ever Phys or Sex IPV 0.26 0.3 0.28 0.26 0.27 0.36 0.4
Conditional on Ever IPV:
Report | Ever Phys or Sex IPV 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.2 0.2 0.24 0.32
Report | Never Phys and Sex IPV 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Notes: Means are weighted by inverse survey sampling weights. * All married and separated women.
Third, following Bobonis et al. (2013), I take into consideration transformations “in marital
matching and sorting patterns due to [...] expected changes in household resources and intra-
household dynamics”. Said transformations in the marriage market only affect younger women
who were beneficiaries of Oportunidades during their childhood. Therefore, Bobonis et al. (2013)
suggest restricting the sample to women more than 28 years old and who began cohabiting in 1997
or earlier.21 What is more, to account for changes in mortality rates and further omitted variable
biases, I only include women less than 60 years old.
Fourth, I restrict the outcome to reports happening after 2001, for two reasons. On the one hand,
the majority of beneficiary women (81%) report that they began receiving the program in 2001 or
after. On the other hand, the exact date of reports to the police becomes dubious or missing if the
time elapsed is too long.
21Oportunidades began in 1997 and the survey’s base year is 2006. Hence, these women were 18 years old in 1997.
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Finally, I consider possible direct effects of Oportunidades on physical and sexual IPV. Namely,
I exclude all women who begin experiencing physical or sexual IPV after receiving Oportunidades.
Furthermore, I control for changes in the frequency and severity of IPV, based on information pro-
vided in ENIDREH-06, by dropping all women who claim that “IPV aggravated as a consequence
of [...] receiving Oportunidades”. In total, 13.2% of the remaining beneficiary women are excluded
from the sample because of these two last restrictions.
A concern about these last two restrictions is possible changes in the “real” population of bene-
ficiaries, which could lead to a different probability of “ever” experiencing physical or sexual IPV.
To test this possibility, I test for changes in the population characteristics. Moreover, I predict the
probability of ever experiencing physical or sexual IPV within municipalities, before (excluding
women who began experiencing sexual or physical IPV after receiving Oportunidades) and after
treatment (including women who began experiencing sexual or physical IPV after receiving Opor-
tunidades). Following Bobonis et al. (2013) and Bobonis and Castro (2010), the prediction model
includes demographic variables, economic variables, a dummy for mother’s IPV during childhood,
as well as a host of polynomials and interaction terms.22
Table A.3 shows the result of changes in the beneficiary population. Apart from a significant
difference in years cohabiting (0.19), there is no real change in the beneficiary population. Like-
wise, Table A.4 present the findings of a difference-in-difference regression for the probability of
experiencing physical or sexual IPV on Oportunidades. The last column in Table A.3 shows a
statistically significant increase in the probability of physical or sexual IPV, on average. However,
the overall magnitude is very small in absolute and relative terms. Furthermore, when I break the
sample down into urban and rural areas, the probability approaches zero. Therefore, both sets of
results show that the sample composition continues to represent the “true” beneficiary population.
All together, I estimate the effects of Oportunidades on reporting IPV conditional on being a
“poor” woman, physically or sexually abused, older than 28 but younger than 60 years of age,
reporting IPV after 2001, and experiencing IPV with a similar intensity prior to receiving Oportu-
22I predict the probability of physical or sexual IPV for the sample of “poor” women (e.g. puntaje higher than
0.383) older than 28 but younger than 60 years of age.
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Table 1.2: Summary Statistics: Beneficiary and Non-beneficiary Women in the Sample (t-stats)
Rural Areas Urban Areas
Group Name of Variable All Non-Ben. Benef. Diff. Non-Ben. Benef. Diff.
Dependent Report IPV to police 0.14 0.12 0.12 0 0.15 0.26 0.10**
Locality Community>14999 0.37 0 0 0 1 1 0
Mun. Empower. 0.51 0.5 0.48 -0.01 0.54 0.54 -0
Mun. Develop. 0.74 0.73 0.7 -0.03*** 0.8 0.78 -0.02***
Demogr. Indigenous woman 0.16 0.11 0.26 0.15*** 0.07 0.17 0.10***
Indigenous men 0.16 0.11 0.25 0.15*** 0.1 0.17 0.07
Age 39.53 40.16 41.36 1.19** 37.04 37.97 0.93
No schooling 0.2 0.23 0.23 0 0.14 0.21 0.07
Primary incomplete 0.31 0.3 0.43 0.13*** 0.19 0.25 0.06
Primary complete 0.23 0.22 0.19 -0.03 0.28 0.26 -0.02
Secondary 0.2 0.18 0.14 -0.04* 0.29 0.24 -0.04
>Secondary 0.06 0.07 0.01 -0.06*** 0.1 0.03 -0.07***
Children<11y. 0.7 0.64 0.66 0.03 0.79 0.8 0
Family size 4.6 4.33 5.3 0.97*** 3.88 4.89 1.01***
Divorced 0.11 0.11 0.06 -0.04** 0.18 0.1 -0.07***
Free-Union 0.29 0.26 0.25 -0.01 0.35 0.37 0.03
Years cohabiting 18.75 19 21.79 2.79*** 14.97 17.77 2.81***
Economic Predicted puntaje 1.47 1.43 1.91 0.48*** 0.99 1.4 0.41***
Asset index -1.02 -0.98 -1.31 -0.33*** -0.68 -1.03 -0.35***
IPV Family harmed 0 0 0 0 0.01 0.01 -0
Seriously harmed 0.15 0.16 0.14 -0.02 0.17 0.15 -0.01
Harmed 0.41 0.38 0.4 0.02 0.44 0.41 -0.03
Hospitalized 0.2 0.22 0.19 -0.03 0.19 0.22 0.03
IPV Frequency 0.24 0.25 0.23 -0.02 0.23 0.23 0
Childhood IPV 0.56 0.57 0.57 0.01 0.55 0.58 0.03
Sample Proportion 1 0.36 0.27 - 0.08 0.29 -
Notes: Means are weighted by inverse survey sampling weights. Difference in means clustered at the municipality
level. Connotations *, **, and *** mean significantly different from zero at the 90 p., 95 p. and 99 p.
nidades. These restrictions result in a sample size equal to 3,444 women.
Table 1.2 reports the means of the covariates for the selected sample, broken down by area (ur-
ban and rural) and treatment group. The vast majority of beneficiaries live in rural areas (83%),23
even though a good proportion of abused, “poor” women live in urban areas (37%). According to
Table 1.2, a simple difference in the outcome means between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries
23This is the same proportion than as in Oportunidades administrative records.
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of Oportunidades is likely to be biased. Thus, I control for difference in observables across groups.
Last, these summary statistics, along with difference in the selection process of Oportunidades,
suggest providing estimations by community size (e.g. rural versus urban areas) for greater accu-
racy.
1.3 Identification Strategy
Even after controlling for differences in observables, there is still a high chance of omitted variable
bias (OVB) due to self-selection into Oportunidades. Namely, there are two main cases in which
the assignment of treatment might be co-determined with the outcome of interest: attrition and
take-up of the program. The former bias happens more frequently in rural areas, where Oportu-
nidades has been operating the longest. The latter bias, in contrast, only occurs in urban areas,
where women had to register for an eligibility evaluation (see Section 1.2).
In the case of attrition, women may self-select out of the program, voluntarily, by not com-
plying with the conditionality requirements (undergoing health check-ups, filling out compliance
forms, picking up cash or a check). What is more, other involuntary mechanisms like transition
into graduation of the program, mistakes in filling compliance forms from the health personnel,
or failure to deliver beneficiaries’ identification forms can affect the permanence of a household
on the roster (Álvarez et al., 2008; p. 644).24 However, here, I am particularly concerned about
voluntary drop-out situations in which abused women, who are undergoing through the process of
reporting IPV to the police, are not able to comply with the conditionality requirements because of
overwhelming health and legal problems.
According to a survival analysis conducted by Álvarez et al. (2008), about 3% of rural house-
holds drop out of Oportunidades every year, voluntarily (excluding graduation attrition).25 González-
24Dropout rates peak at certain periods. This spikes are associated with administrative problems such as operational
difficulties in launching Oportunidades at the beginning of 1998, changes in the operational guidelines in 1999, and
the introduction of the “just-in-time” system in 2001 (Álvarez et al., 2008).
25Wealthier household among the “poor”, living in marginal communities, were more likely to drop out of the
Oportunidades. However, in less marginal communities, the poorest households were also as likely to drop out of the
program as the wealthier among the “poor”. Similarly, male recipients, older recipients, less educated beneficiaries,
more-dependent families, indigenous Mexicans, and single-headed households had higher attrition rates (Álvarez et
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Flores, Heracleous and Winters, (2012) expand this survival analysis to household living in ur-
ban areas, where voluntary drop-out rates are 5.6% per year (excluding graduation attrition).26
Nonetheless, Oportunidades has been operating in rural areas much longer than it has in urban
areas. Hence, provided that I control for graduation attrition in my sample selection, total drop-out
rates are likely to be lower in urban areas than in rural areas.
Just as attrition does, take-up of the program in urban areas might bias the ATE estimations
in equation (1.1). For instance, eligible women who are more likely to seek alternatives outsides
marriage or to gain bargaining power within the same relationship are also the ones signing-up for
the program in urban areas. Put differently, treated urban women would use the justice system at a
higher rate, no matter what.
If take-up biases turn out to be true, then the estimations are biased upwards: Cov(Ti,εi) > 0.
On the other hand, if the drop-out scenario persists, then the estimations are downward biased:
Cov(Ti,εi) < 0. These self-selection biases, however, are not mutually exclusive. Hence, both
kinds of biases can co-exist, at least for urban beneficiaries.
In the presence of OVB, the assumption of exogeneity on the assignment of treatment for
equation (1.1) no longer holds. Therefore, I recur to two exogenous variables —the ratio of IMSS-
Oportunidades hospitals to total Oportunidades healthcare providers, and the roll-out in the densi-
fication process of Oportunidades— to estimate the assignment of treatment (T ):
P(Ti) = ζ + γZm +φXi +νi, (1.2)
where Z is the set of excluded instrumental variables (IVs) at the municipality level (m), X is
the same matrix of individual observable controls than as in equation (1.1), and ν are all individual
al., 2008).
26Just as in less marginal rural areas, wealthier households, older beneficiaries, male recipients, more-dependent
families, and single-headed households were more likely to leave Oportunidades for behavioral reasons in urban
areas. However, “unlike in rural areas, indigenous households [were] much less likely to drop out for behavioral [...]
or administrative [...] reasons. [Perhaps, this is because] [...] [t]he indigenous population living in the urban areas
may have fewer issues with understanding program materials in Spanish (96% of indigenous recipients in the sample
are bilingual) compared to the rural indigenous population, [...] [and because] Oportunidades made a greater effort to
reach out to this population” (González-Flores et al. 2012).
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unobservables that affect treatment. The exclusion restriction is that Cov(Zm,εi) = 0, where εi is
the error term in equation (1.1). Put differently, the exclusion restriction asserts that both IVs do
not affect the outcome of interest other than through the assignment of treatment. I use a bivariate
probit model for my main two-stage estimations because the outcome and treatment variables are
both binary. In addition, I apply a linear two-stage least squares for comparability purposes.
1.3.1 Ratio of IMSS-Oportunidades hospitals to total Healthcare Providers
The two institutions in charge of providing the healthcare components of Oportunidades and filling
out the conditionality compliance forms are IMSS-Oportunidades (IMSS) and Secretaría de Salud
(SSA). The federal government manages the former, whereas the states’ governments administer
the latter. According to Álvarez et al., (2008; p. 651), rural beneficiary households “using IMSS
as a healthcare provider are much less likely to drop out than those using SSA.” Specifically, in a
period of 6 years, 25% of rural recipients using SSA are expected to drop out from the program,
compared with 10% for IMSS’s rural recipients users (Álvarez et al., 2008; p. 654).
Álvarez et al. (2008, p. 654) attribute this gap in drop-out rates to institutional quality differ-
ences between healthcare providers:
SSA staff are often recent graduates from medical schools, who are deployed to these
health posts for durations of less than a year. This may lead to increased mistakes in
monitoring conditions and in reporting failure to meet conditions. It may also be that
IMSS staff get to know recipients better and are thus more likely to follow through to
ensure that recipients meet conditions. [...] [Moreover,] there is a geographic overlap
in the coverage of the providers in that they serve different communities within the
same state, [meaning that this variable does not capture regional effects].27
I gather healthcare infrastructure data from the Mexican National Institute of Statistic and Ge-
ography (INEGI) in order to build the first IV: the ratio of IMSS-Oportunidades hospitals to total
27In 1984, when the Mexican public health sector was decentralized (co-run with the State governments), some
IMSS-Oportunidades hospitals —933 units in 14 states— became SSA hospitals (Merino, 2003). This political decen-
tralization process —an exogenous policy decision— is the main explanation for why IMSS-Oportunidades operates
in certain municipalities as opposed to and not others. Therefore, local infrastructure cannot be the main reason for
“institutional” attrition in Oportunidades but rather the human resources in charge of running these hospitals. What is
more, the vast majority of SSA and IMSS-Oportunidades hospitals were already standing prior to the implementation
of Oportunidades. IMSS-Oportunidades hospitals had a different name, IMSS-Coplamar, at the time.
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Figure 1.2: Dynamic Analysis of Oportunidades Health Providers
Oportunidades healthcare providers (sum of IMSS-Oportunidades plus SSA hospitals). The logic
behind this IV goes as follows: As the probability of having IMSS as a healthcare provider in-
creases, so does the likelihood of remaining in Oportunidades.
Whether this IV may be excluded from the second stage is an untestable question. Nevertheless,
there are very few channels, alternative to the assignment of treatment, through which the presence
of IMSS hospitals as opposed to SSA hospitals may influence the reporting of IPV. The most
obvious one is preferences for hospitalization after an IPV attack. Hence, I include a dummy for
individual hospitalizations while controlling for health hazards and frequency of IPV.28 According
the results below, hospitalization is a significant predictor of reporting IPV to the police.
Fortunately for my identification, the ratio of IMSS hospitals to total Oportunidades healthcare
providers remained stable between 1998 and 2006, the years in which a recipient in my sample
could have been treated. The dynamic stability of my IV reinforces its exogeneity validity be-
cause abrupt variations could affect the outcomes through channels other than the assignment of
28Thus, the exclusion restriction for this first IV is the following: Conditional on individual’s hospitalization, the
ratio of IMSS-Oportunidades hospitals to total Oportunidades health providers has no effect on reporting IPV to the
police other than through the assignment of treatment.
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treatment.29 Figure 1.2 depicts the ratio of IMSS-Oportunidades hospitals to total Oportunidades
healthcare providers (solid line), and the average number of IMSS-Oportunidades and SSA hospi-
tals per municipality (lines with figures).30
Figure 1.3: Compliance: Ratio of IMSS-Oportunidades over Oportunidades Health Providers
Last, according to administrative data, healthcare provider drop-out variation does not exist for
urban households (González-Flores et al., 2012). This could be because staff in urban SSA hospi-
tals are more experienced due to higher labor competition for medical positions (González-Flores
et al., 2012). To illustrate this fact, Figure 1.3 presents the results of an exercise for the assign-
ment of treatment similar to the one conducted by Card (1993). This exercise divides discretely
the sample by the variation in the excluded variable (e.g. high versus low ratio using the median
value).31
Evidently, Figure 1.3 shows that the IV works rather well for household living in rural areas
29Therefore, under this IV, the risk in the assignment of treatment is the same for all years, for most municipalities,
regardless of when the woman begins receiving Oportunidades.
30The ratio remains around 2.5 SSA hospitals for every IMSS-Oportunidades hospital (left axis). The average
number of IMSS and SSA hospitals per municipality is 1.75 and 4.5 (right axis), respectively.
31Card’s (1993) visual exercise consists in predicting the probability of being a beneficiary of Oportunidades using
the predicted puntaje estimated above (left y-axis) and all other observables. To test whether the IV is correlated with
a higher probability of being a recipient of Oportunidades, I fit the prediction using a sub-sample with the upper-half
of the IMSS-provider ratio value. Finally, this visual exercise divides the predicted treatment probability into quartiles.
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(right panel). Even though the poorest urban recipients also seem to comply with the IV (left
panel), the results are weak because there are not many households in the (pooled) fourth quartile
in urban areas. Consequently, this IV does not find a solution for drop-out or take-up biases in
urban areas.
1.3.2 Roll-out in the Densification Process of Oportunidades
In order to solve for self-selection biases in urban areas, I recur to a second IV: the roll-out in the
densification process of Oportunidades. This densification process was carried out in seven years
(1998-2004), meaning that the program was densified in different places at different times. For this
IV, I use Oportunidades’s administrative data containing the roster of beneficiaries at the locality
level (smaller geo-political unit than municipality).32 In particular, I consider a municipality to be
densified once its roster reaches 25% of total beneficiaries in 2005.
The intuition for this second IV suggests that as more urban women enroll in Oportunidades,
then other urban women with similar economic characteristics are more likely to register in the
future due to flow of information. Moreover, urban households mistakenly excluded have higher
chances of enrolling during re-certification campaigns conducted every two years. Finally, the
roll-out in the densification process of Oportunidades is unlikely to have a direct effect on report-
ing IPV to the police. However, provided that administrators gave priority to the most marginal
municipalities (see section 1.2), I control for human and gender development of a municipality.33
These development indexes turn out to be significant predictors of reporting IPV to the police and,
thus, necessary for a valid exclusion restriction.
32I use the variation at the municipality level rather than at the locality level because the smallest geographical area
publicly available for ENDIREH-06 is municipalities.
33All together, the exclusion restriction for this IV claims that, after controlling for municipality-specific develop-
ment factors, the roll-out for the densification process of Oportunidades does not affect the reporting of IPV to the
police other than through treatment.
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1.4 Results
1.4.1 Effect of Oportunidades on Reporting IPV to the Police
Table 1.3 contains the estimated effect of Oportunidades on reporting IPV to the police for the
pooled sample (rural and urban women). Columns 1 to 3 present the results of running a maximum-
likelihood probit regression for equation (1.1).34 The first column is the most parsimonious spec-
ification and includes only municipality and demographic controls. Municipality controls are two
development indexes: IDH (human development) and IPG (women’s empowerment development).
Demographic controls contain indicator variables for woman’s age, woman’s ethnicity (indige-
nous), woman’s education, presence of children under the age of 12, family size, years in union,
and current marital status (e.g. married, cohabiting, or divorced). Furthermore, I include a dummy
for rural areas to control for differences across beneficiary populations. For this specification, I
find a statistically significant effect of Oportunidades on reporting IPV to the police equal to 3.8%,
at the 95% level of confidence. In relative terms, this accounts for a non-trivial increase of 27.3%.
Next, column 2 reports estimations with IPV controls. These are dummies for IPV frequency,
hospitalization following from an IPV attack, and physical harm. As the criminology literature
predicts, the previous variables are all crucial determinants of reporting IPV to the police (Black,
1976; Felson et al., 2002; Thompson and Kingree, 2006). After incorporating IPV controls, the
ATE increases to 4.2% (30.2%). This effect is also statistically distinguishable from zero.
Column 3 includes the predicted puntaje and an asset index in the set of covariates.35 How-
ever, the inclusion of these controls does not change the ATE because the sample selection reduces
much of the distance in the difference between treatment groups. Moreover, if treatment is endoge-
nous, then both of these variables are also endogenous due to economic mobility from receiving
Oportunidades.
In order to solve for OVB, the rest of the columns in Table 1.3 incorporate a first stage using
the ratio of IMSS-Oportunidades hospitals to total Oportunidades healthcare providers and the
34OLS estimations draw very similar conclusions. These estimations are only available upon request.
35To build the asset index, I apply a factor analysis following Sahn and Stiefel (2003).
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Table 1.3: Effect of Oportunidades on Reporting IPV to the Police: Pooled Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Probit Probit Probit Biprobit 2SLS Biprobit 2SLS Biprobit 2SLS
Oportunidades 0.038** 0.042** 0.042** 0.034* 0.164 0.042*** 0.246* 0.044*** 0.235*
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.136) (0.014) (0.135) (0.015) (0.136)
Instruments No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Muni. controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demo. controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
IPV controls No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Puntaje-Assets No No Yes No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 3444 3444 3444 3444 3444 3444 3444 3444 3444
Municipalities 776 776 776 776 776 776 776 776 776
GOF p-stat 0.000 0.000 0.000
Overidentif. 0.296 0.405 0.398
Endogeneity 0.403 0.147 0.174
F-stat IV 10.08 9.85 9.75
Redundacy 0.016 0.017 0.014
Marginal effects
Notes: Regressions contain robust standard errors, clustered by municipalities, in parentheses. Excluded instrumen-
tal variables are the rollout in the densification process and the ratio of IMSS-Oportunidades over health providers.
Murphy’s goodness-of-fit score tests for excess kurtosis in the errors. The Hansen J statistic reports a test of over-
identifying restrictions. The C statistic presents the result of the Hausman endogeneity test. Redundancy is an LM
test for an invalid IV. Connotations *, **, and *** mean significantly different from zero at the 90 p., 95 p. and 99 p.
roll-out in the densification process of Oportunidades as IVs. I present bivariate probit (biprobit)
regressions —in columns 4, 6, and 8— and linear IV (2SLS) regressions —in columns 5, 7, and 9—
for equations (1.1) and (1.2). Despite sharing the same vector of excluded of variables, there are
important differences in the estimation process between the 2SLS model and the biprobit model.
On the one hand, the former dismisses the dependent variables as probability functions in both
stages. On the other hand, the latter maintains equations (1.1) and (1.2) as likelihood functions.
Most important, the 2SLS estimator is unbiased in providing the local average treatment effect
(LATE), but inefficient if sample sizes are below 5,000 or treatment probabilities are low (Chirubis,
Das and Lokshin, 2012).36 In contrast, the biprobit estimator provides much greater precision for
the ATE, but at the expenses of having to assume standard bivariate normal error terms (Chirubis
et al. 2012).
36LATE is “the Wald estimand [which] can be interpreted as the effect of [the IV] [...] on those whose treatment
status can be changed by the instrument” (Angrist and Pischke, 2009; ch.4). When using multiple-IVs, LATE is only
“a linear combination of the underlying Wald estimators. In other words, it is a linear combination of the instrument-
specific LATEs using the instruments one at a time” (Angrist and Pischke, 2009; ch.4).
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Findings in Table 1.3 indicate that biprobit estimations are less than a fifth of the 2SLS. Even
though the 2SLS reports the LATE as opposed to the ATE, these differences in findings come from
inefficiencies in the linear estimator rather than from differences between the LATE and the ATE
(Chirubis, 2012). Therefore, provided that my sample size is below 5,000, it is imperative to use a
biprobit approach for efficient estimations.
The inefficiency of the 2SLS notwithstanding, I exploit some linear tests to validate my identi-
fication strategy. In particular, I am interested in over-identification tests and in F-statistic tests for
excluded variables.37 According to the Hansen J, all specifications fail to reject the null hypothesis
of valid IVs. Moreover, the linear tests suggest non-weak IVs because F-statistics are around 10,
which is the conventional rule-of-thumb for non-weak IVs. In addition, I test for redundancy be-
tween instruments, showing improvement in the efficiency of the estimations. Last, both IVs affect
assignment of treatment in the predicted direction (see Table A.5 for first-stage estimations).
Column 4 in Table 1.3 shows the results of using a biprobit model with the most parsimonious
specifications. After accounting for OVB, the ATE shrinks 0.4% from the “biased” probit estimator
to 3.4% (24.4%). However, as explained in the identification strategy, the exclusion restriction may
be violated because this specification does not incorporate individual hospitalizations (part of IPV
control group).
When including IPV controls —my preferred specification— as in columns 6, the ATE remains
unchanged at 4.2% (30.2%). Similarly, the ATE varies little when controlling for puntaje and assets
(column 8). The lack of changes between the probit and the biprobit results imply either zero OVB
or compensation of drop-out biases by take-up biases. In order to make an accurate assessment, I
conduct the same analysis for rural and urban areas, separately.
Table 1.4 presents the same previous models for the rural sample, exclusively. Prima facie,
the results are much lower than for the pooled sample and are statistically indistinguishable from
zero. The most parsimonious specification, in column 1, shows an effect close to 0.7%, in absolute
terms, or 5.0%, in relative terms. Once I include IPV controls (column 2), the ATE for rural abused
37The over-identification tests report the p-value of the Hansen-J statistic because I use robust standard errors,
clustered by municipalities.
23
women increases to 1.2% (8.6%), although it remains relatively low. When controlling for puntaje
and assets (column 3), then the estimated ATE is 1.4% (10.1%).
Table 1.4: Effect of Oportunidades on Reporting IPV to the Police: Rural Areas Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Probit Probit Probit Biprobit 2SLS Biprobit 2SLS Biprobit 2SLS
Oportunidades 0.007 0.012 0.014 0.041 -0.039 0.058* 0.079 0.052 0.063
(0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.034) (0.224) (0.030) (0.230) (0.040) (0.223)
Instruments No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Muni. controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demo. controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
IPV controls No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Puntaje-Assets No No Yes No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 1920 1920 1920 1920 1920 1920 1920 1920 1920
Municipalities 627 627 627 627 627 627 627 627 627
GOF p-stat 0.000 0.000 0.000
Endogeneity 0.840 0.766 0.824
F-stat IV 7.17 7.01 7.83
Marginal effects
Notes: Regressions contain robust standard errors, clustered by municipalities, in parentheses. Excluded instrumental
variable is the ratio of IMSS over health providers. Murphy’s goodness-of-fit score tests for excess kurtosis in the err-
ors. The Hansen J statistic reports a test of overidentifying restrictions. The C statistic presents the result of the Haus-
man endogeneity test. Connotations *, **, and *** mean significantly different from zero at the 90 p., 95 p. and 99 p.
Nevertheless, drop-out biases may be attenuating (downward bias) the ATE of Oportunidades.
Column 4 shows that, once OVB is accounted for by using the ratio of IMSS-Oportunidades hos-
pitals to total healthcare providers as an IV, the ATE increases to a magnitude close to the pooled
sample: 4.1% (29.4%). In fact, when I control for OVB and IPV factors (column 6) —my fa-
vorite specification— the ATE for rural women is higher than for the combined sample, at 5.8%
(41.7%). Most important, this latter finding is statistically significant. Not surprisingly, the linear
IV estimations remain inefficient because the sample size is reduced to almost half.
Table 1.5 shows the estimations for the effect of Oportunidades on reporting IPV to the police,
for the urban sample. In stark contrast to the rural sample, the prima facie ATE for urban women
is much higher than for the pooled sample. For instance, the shortest specification, in column 1,
estimates an effect equal to 12.5% (89.9%). After including further controls (columns 2 and 3), the
ATE decreases to 11.9% (85.6%) or 11.2 (80.6%), depending on the set of additional covariates.
However, as the identification strategy explains, the ATE for the urban sample is biased due
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Table 1.5: Effect of Oportunidades on Reporting IPV to the Police: Urban Areas Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Probit Probit Probit Biprobit 2SLS Biprobit 2SLS Biprobit 2SLS
Oportunidades 0.125*** 0.119*** 0.112*** 0.040*** 0.613 0.044* 0.825 0.049** 0.849
(0.040) (0.036) (0.037) (0.013) (0.516) (0.023) (0.537) (0.023) (0.574)
Instruments No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Muni. controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demo. controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
IPV controls No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Puntaje-Assets No No Yes No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 1524 1524 1524 1524 1524 1524 1524 1524 1524
Municipalities 283 283 283 283 283 283 283 283 283
GOF p-stat 0.000 0.000 0.000
Endogeneity 0.268 0.092 0.095
F-stat IV 3.37 3.40 3.28
Marginal effects
Notes: Regressions contain robust standard errors, clustered by municipalities, in parentheses. Excluded instrumental
variable is the rollout in the densification process. Murphy’s goodness-of-fit score tests for excess kurtosis in the err-
ors. The Hansen J statistic reports a test of overidentifying restrictions. The C statistic presents the result of the Haus-
man endogeneity test. Connotations *, **, and *** mean significantly different from zero at the 90 p., 95 p. and 99 p.
to take-up of the program (upward bias). After introducing a first stage with the roll-out in the
densification process of Oportunidades as an IV, the ATE becomes almost identical to the pooled
“unbiased” effect, at 4.0% (28.8%). Similarly, my preferred specification, which controls for IPV
characteristics and solves for OVB, yields an ATE of 4.4% (31.6%). In all, findings for rural and
urban areas samples are consistent with the self-selection bias theories and are very close to the
overall pooled sample after controlling for OVB.38
1.4.2 Robustness Tests
To make ensure that these results are not driven by chance, I conduct several robustness tests.
The first robustness test checks for a confounding effect between states’ specialized IPV laws
and Oportunidades. Specifically, the Mexican Congress ratified the Belém do Pará International
Convention in 1998, right at the time when Oportunidades began operating. Subsequently, the
majority of the Mexican States adopted the convention through specialized IPV laws at different
38Findings for all the different sample (Tables 1.3, 1.4 and 1.5) seem to be consistent with the criminology literature
insofar as the coefficients for IPV frequency, hospitalization following from an IPV attack, severity of harm caused to
the woman, and presence of children in the household are all statistically different than zero (Black, 1976; Felson et
al, 2002; Thompson and Kingree, 2006). Coefficient estimations for all these covariates are available upon request.
25
times during the following 12 years. Table A.6 presents the roll-out of these specialized IPV
laws. If women respond to new specialized IPV laws and if there is geographical overlap between
treatment and the enactment of IPV laws, then the estimated ATE for Oportunidades could be
biased. Therefore, this robustness test controls for the enactment of states’ specialized IPV laws,
measured in years from the survey’s base date (e.g. October, 2006).
Tables A.7, A.8, and A.9, in Appendix A, show the results of this robustness test for the pooled,
rural, and urban samples, respectively. The results indicate a very small, positive effect of special-
ized IPV laws on reporting IPV to the police. Namely, the effect of IPV specialized laws is 0.15%
additional reports for every additional year since enactment. Moreover, the ATE of Oportunidades
on reporting IPV to the police remains practically unchanged for the probit models and biprobit
models (e.g. an average drop of 0.1%). Therefore, if there is any confounding effect at all, it is
very small.
Second, I test for the sensitivity of the ATE to a variety of specifications. For instance, I in-
corporate the following variables into the set of demographic controls: a dummy indicator for dirt
floor, toilet in the household, drainage, crowding index, husband’s ethnicity, higher-order poly-
nomials for women’s woman’s age and family size, and interaction terms between woman’s ed-
ucation and higher-order polynomials. In addition, I include more IPV controls such as harm to
other members of the family, a dummy indicator for parent’s IPV during childhood, higher-order
polynomials for the enactment of specialized IPV laws, and police investigators in a municipality.
Appendix A also contains the results for this robustness test. The maximum-likelihood probit
models for all samples (column 1 to 3 in Tables A.10, A.11, and A.12) show an improvement on
the ATE equal to 0.2%, against the direction of the bias. However, the findings in the biprobit
models barely change, if at all. Therefore, these modest improvements do not justify a “kitchen
sink” regression.
The third robustness test excludes observations that do not meet the selection poverty cutoff
(0.384-0.69). This test checks whether the results are all driven by the section of technically
ineligible beneficiaries. In total, this new poverty threshold drops 793 observations, which accounts
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for one-quarter of the sample. Both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries are excluded from the
sample with this alternative poverty cutoff.
Tables A.13, A.14, and A.15, in Appendix A, shows the results for this third robustness test.
For the rural sample (Table A.14), the ATE drops 1.4% on average. This could indicate a higher
attrition rate for “poorer” abused rural women, who do report IPV to the police. Yet, the biprobit
model also shows a similar drop in the ATE. Therefore, a good portion of the treatment effect
in rural areas is driven by the “quasi-poor,” although not all of it. Conversely, the urban sample
findings remain rather close to the original estimations.
Last, I validate the results using conditional fixed-effects. Unfortunately, this inferential method
requires variation in the dependent variable within a municipality. Thus, the sample size shrinks to
almost half, taking away much of the power for estimation.
Table A.16 shows the results for the conditional fixed-effects. Although the ATE estimations
differ from the biprobit model, all conditional fixed-effects models move against the bias just as the
self-selection theory would predict. The improvement factor is about 1.6% on average. However,
most of the coefficients for the conditional fixed-effects models are not significantly different from
zero. Hence, the importance of maintaining a bigger sample size for more accurate causality
estimations.
1.5 Institutional Channels
Thus far, estimations suggest a robust, positive effect of Oportunidades on reporting IPV to the
police. However, results remain silent about the channels through which Oportunidades has an
impact on the final outcome. In what follows, I propose two groups of causality channels: i)
formal institutions and ii) informal institutions.
1.5.1 Formal Institutions
Oportunidades might have an effect on the operational effectiveness of formal institutions that
lead to higher reporting rates. These institutions are rules agreed upon in advance by the “whole”
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society and expressed in the law (North, 1991). I use two proxies to represent the operational
effectiveness of formal institutions: assimilation of women’s rights, and trusts in the police. Both
variables gather formal institutions because the Mexican Constitution and Procedural Organic Law
spell out the existence of women’s rights and procedural rules (e.g. duties of the police, due
process, etc.) Moreover, in theory, both formal institutions have a positive impact on the final
outcome.
ENDIREH-06 provides information for both proxies of formal institutions. For assimilation of
women’s rights, the survey asks each woman whether “she feels rightful, personally” . Similarly,
the survey identifies the reasons for not reporting IPV to the police. “Distrust in the police” is
among these reasons. Hence, I am able to measure trust in the police (inverse), conditional on not
reporting IPV to the police.39
Table 1.6 presents the results for the effect of Oportunidades on assimilation of women’s rights
and trust in the police. Having established the existence of self-selection biases in the effect of
Oportunidades on reporting IPV to the police, I expect an analogous bias for channels affecting the
final outcome. Therefore, I report both probit and biprobit estimations of my preferred specification
(municipality, demographic and IPV controls).
The top panel in Table 1.6 contains the results for the effect of Oportunidades on assimilation
of women’s rights by area. Columns 1 and 2 show this effect for the pooled sample. The estimated
absolute (relative) effect of Oportunidades on assimilation of women’s rights for the probit and
biprobit models is 2.3% (2.4%) and 22.2% (23.6%), respectively. This effect is similar among rural
beneficiaries (columns 3 and 4). However, for urban women, the treatment effect on assimilation of
women’s rights is about half of that. What is more, the self-selection theory is consistent for rural
beneficiaries but inconsistent for urban beneficiaries; even though the coefficients for the urban
sample are not statistically distinguishable from zero. All together, Oportunidades has a positive
effect on assimilation of women’s rights.
39For this proxy, however, I assume trust in the police among non-reporting abused women to be similar or inferior
to that among those women who do report IPV to the police, based on rationality. To be clear, reporting IPV to the
police would be irrational if there is null expected return.
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Table 1.6: Formal Institutional Channels
Panel A. Effect of Oportunidades on Assimilation of Women’s Rights†
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Probit Biprobit Probit Biprobit Probit Biprobit
Oportunidades 0.023** 0.222*** 0.023 0.263*** 0.014 0.115
(0.010) (0.055) (0.014) (0.078) (0.015) (0.089)
Muni. controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demo. controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
IPV controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Puntaje-Assets No No No No No No
Sample All All Rural Rural Urban Urban
Observations 3442 3442 1919 1919 1523 1523
Municipalities 775 775 627 627 282 282
Marginal effects
Panel B. Effects of Oportunidades on Trust in the Police, Conditional on not Reporting IPV††
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Probit Biprobit Probit Biprobit Probit Biprobit
Oportunidades 0.015 0.108** 0.034* 0.213*** -0.045 0.080***
(0.017) (0.045) (0.019) (0.065) (0.031) (0.026)
Muni. controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demo. controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
IPV controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Puntaje-Assets No No No No No No
Sample All All Rural Rural Urban Urban
Observations 2907 2907 1673 1673 1234 1234
Municipalities 740 740 600 600 256 256
Marginal effects
Notes: All regressions contain robust standard errors, clustered by municipalities, in
parentheses. Excluded instrumental variables are the rollout of the densification process
(C2 and C6) and the ratio of IMSS-Oportunidades over health providers (C2 and C4).
*, **, and *** mean significantly different from zero at the 90 p., 95 p. and 99 p.
+ Mean (SD) of Assimilation of Women‘s Rights: 0.94 (0.23).
++ Mean (SD) of Trust in the Police, Conditional on not Reporting IPV: 0.90 (0.30).
The bottom panel in Table 1.6 reports the effects of Oportunidades on trust in the police by
area. Just as with assimilation of women’s rights, Oportunidades also has a positive effect on trust
in the police. The unbiased effect for the pooled sample (column 2) is 10.8% in absolute terms or
12.1% in relative terms. This effect is similar in magnitude for the urban sample. In contrast, the
unbiased absolute (relative) effect of Oportunidades on trust in the police for rural beneficiaries is
twice as much at 21.3% (23.6%). Most important, all coefficient are statistically significant from
zero across samples.
These findings are consistent in sign with the causality theory. Moreover, results relate to a
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body of literature looking at the positive effects of CCTs on social trust (Attanasio, Pellerano and
Polanía Reyes, 2009), political empowerment (Amarante and Vigorito, 2009), and government
support (Manacorda, Miguel and Vigorito 2011) in Latin American countries (e.g. Colombia and
Uruguay).
1.5.2 Informal Institutions
Table 1.7: Informal Institutional Channels
Panel A. Effects of Oportunidades on Willingness to Separate,
Conditional on Currently Married or Cohabiting.†
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Probit Biprobit Probit Biprobit Probit Biprobit
Oportunidades 0.051** -0.013 0.021 0.016 0.109** 0.060***
(0.024) (0.055) (0.023) (0.089) (0.048) (0.018)
Muni. controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demo. controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
IPV controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Puntaje-Assets No No No No No No
Sample All All Rural Rural Urban Urban
Observations 2977 2977 1736 1736 1241 1241
Municipalities 745 745 600 600 265 265
Marginal effects
Panel B. Effects of Oportunidades on Willingness to Reconcile,
Conditional on Currently Married or Cohabiting.††
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Probit Biprobit Probit Biprobit Probit Biprobit
Oportunidades -0.026 -0.038 -0.016 -0.059 -0.056* -0.029
(0.019) (0.100) (0.022) (0.175) (0.033) (0.125)
Muni. controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demo. controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
IPV controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Puntaje-Assets No No No No No No
Sample All All Rural Rural Urban Urban
Observations 2980 2980 1736 1736 1244 1244
Municipalities 745 745 600 600 265 265
Marginal effects
Notes: All regressions contain robust standard errors, clustered by municipalities, in
parentheses. Excluded instrumental variables are the rollout of the densification process
(C2 and C6) and the ratio of IMSS-Oportunidades over health providers (C2 and C4).
*, **, and *** mean significantly different from zero at the 90 p., 95 p. and 99 p.
+ Mean (SD) of Willing to Separate, Conditional on Currently Married: 0.22 (0.41).
++ Mean (SD) of Willing to Reconcile, Conditional on Currently Married: 0.16 (0.37).
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Similarly, Oportunidades could change the threat point for some women —because of economic
resources from the program—and thus could ease the burden of ostracism costs, created by social
norms. In contrast to formal institutions, informal (social) institutions are not set in advance and,
therefore, impose inefficiency costs that inhibit reporting IPV to the police (North, 1991; Posner,
2001). To proxy for informal institutions, I choose two variables related to the marriage market:
willingness to leave the relationship (separate) and willingness to reconcile. ENDIREH-06 asks
all married or cohabiting abused women about future plans to separate from their current part-
ners. Likewise, the survey identifies those married or cohabiting women who separated from but
reconciled with their current abusive partners.
Findings in Table 1.7 indicate that Oportunidades has an effect on the transformation of the
marriage market but only in urban areas. Namely, the unbiased ATE of Oportunidades on willing-
ness to separate for urban beneficiaries is 10.9% or 27.7% in absolute or relative terms, respectively
(columns 5 and 6). Moreover, the results match the self-selection bias theory which predicts higher
take-up rates for urban beneficiaries seeking to gain bargaining power. This positive effect, how-
ever, is not statistically different from zero for the rural and pooled samples.
By the same token, the bottom panel shows the effect of Oportunidades on willingness to recon-
cile. All of the estimations move in the “right” direction: less willing to reconcile after treatment.
Moreover, all coefficients behave according to what the self-selection bias theory in my identifi-
cation strategy predicts: attrition for the rural sample and take-up for the urban sample. However,
here again the results are only statistically distinguishable from zero for the urban sample. This
could be because ostracism costs are much lower in urban areas than in rural areas.
These findings are consistent with the conclusions of Bobonis (2011), who studies union
dissolution among rural Oportunidades beneficiaries. He finds a rather modest treatment effect
(0.32%) using randomized data. Most important, results for rural beneficiaries are in line with the
“extractive-private information models” —in that the threat point for treated rural women does not
change— just as in Angelucci (2008) and Bobonis et al. (2013).
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1.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I find a robust, positive effect of Oportunidades on reporting IPV to the police
equal to 4.2% (30.2%). The channels through which the effect of Oportunidades works into the
final outcome include increases in the operational effectiveness of formal institutions and changes
in the market equilibrium of marriage or cohabitation. The former set of channels mainly take
place in rural areas, whereas the latter channels do so in urban areas.
These inferential results have immediate policy applications. For instance, Oportunidades ad-
ministrators could implement a randomized exercise in which women are incentivized to report
IPV by means of information. This additional information could be conveyed during the monthly
pláticas, where women and Oportunidades staff could discuss IPV health hazards and the advan-
tages of using the police.
If this randomization exercise works for the treated population, then it can be expanded to the
control group in Oportunidades and outside of Oportunidades as a CCT program of its own. The
advantage of keeping this proposal within Oportunidades is the low budget needed to implement
it. In theory, this policy should not cost a lot of money because all fixed costs (e.g. system,
focalization, infrastructure, cash transfer) have already been covered. Most important, the benefits
of establishing the rule of law are very great, economically speaking; particularly for a country like
Mexico, where impunity prevails.
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2 THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE
MEXICAN DRUG WAR
Mexico’s previous federal administration (December, 2006 to December, 2012), headed by
President Felipe Calderon, launched an unprecedented military strategy to capture as many drug-
lords as possible. This was the government’s response to an expansion in drug-related activity and
violence. Between 2001 and 2006, prior to the launching of the Mexican Drug War, total yearly
drug-related homicides increased 94%, from 1,080 to 2,100 (Chabat, 2010).
However, after the implementation of Calderon’s military policy, yearly drug-related homicides
spiked to levels above exponential rates. In 2010 alone, total drug-related homicides ascended
to over 16,000 —eight times more than in 2006. The existing literature suggests that the main
causal link between Calderon’s military strategy and the spike in drug-related violence was the
fragmentation of drug-trafficking organizations, hereinafter DTOs (Dell, 2011; Guerrero, 2011;
Merino, 2011; Calderon et al., 2012).
Specifically, after the decapitation of DTOs, the level of competition rose significantly because
these groups organized themselves horizontally (cells), as opposed to vertically (hierarchies). Also,
competition grew because the federal government decided to fight all DTOs instead of the most
violent groups. Worse yet, the government oftentimes dismantled and ultimately abandoned local
enforcement institutions, eliminating the possibility of order in the medium run. In all, the strategy
was inappropriate, and therefore, it backfired.
Calderon’s administration, through its Economy Minister, contended fiercely that the conflict
did not have any consequence on the economy (El Universal, 2012). However, the Economy
Minister never provided scientific research to back up his claim. The purpose of this chapter is to
fill this policy-knowledge gap by testing empirically whether the Mexican Drug War had an effect
on economic development in treated states, using gross domestic product (GDP) per capita as the
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outcome of interest. The case study of the Mexican Drug War is unique in its kind because the
conflict took place in states with different levels of GDP per capita.
In an attempt to estimate the impact of the Mexican Drug War on GDP per capita for treated
states, the research design in this chapter consists mostly of synthetic control methods. This re-
cently developed econometric technique compares a homogenous control state, produced by ap-
plying a two-step optimization procedure, with a “treated” state over time. I define a state as
“treated” if, at any point during Calderon’s administration (2006-2012), Mexico’s federal forces
had an executive mandate to be a primary security provider in that state.40 To prove causality more
systematically, I use panel data on statewide military operations conducted by the Mexican Army,
as well as the geographic rollout of the war.
Findings indicate a reduction of 0.5% in GDP per capita for treated states, over the period
2003-2012, as a direct consequence of the Mexican Drug War. Determinants include a proportional
reduction in consumption per capita for treated states. By the same token, the Mexican Drug War
caused a decline in productive investment of at least 0.3%, driven by a drop of 3.2% in commercial
credit (non-consumption and non-mortgage) per capita granted to the private sector.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 1 describes the Mexican Drug War, briefly. Section
2 identifies a proxy for the Mexican Drug War, and proves orthogonality in the assignment of
treatment. Section 3 lays the foundations for the empirical strategy. Section 4 presents the results
and robustness checks. Section 5 analyzes the economic determinants by which the Mexican Drug
War hampered GDP per capita. Finally, I conclude with immediate policy applications.
2.1 The Mexican Drug War
2.1.1 Background
The true political reasons for launching a large-scale drug war remain unknown.41 One fact, how-
ever, is that President Calderon encountered a more complicated national security threat than all
40The three legs of the federal forces are the Mexican Army, the Mexican Navy, and the Federal Police.
41Some scholars claim that the Mexican Drug War was a political strategy to legitimize Calderon’s presidency after
a rather narrow electoral victory of only 0.56%. Other experts suggest it was a desperate action to attend existing
security concerns (see Chabat, 2010).
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of his predecessors. Whereas most Mexican presidents were able to regulate drug-trafficking ac-
tivities through a “pax mafiosa,” three structural factors damaged the Mexican tolerance policy
(Chabat, 2010).
First, Mexico began cooperating with U.S. government agencies to eliminate the supply of
illicit drugs. In September 1975, the Mexican Army, in coordination with the U.S. Drug Enforce-
ment Administration (DEA), implemented “Operation Condor,” the first military strategy against
the supply of illicit drugs (Craig, 1980).42 This partnership in law enforcement expanded after the
assassination of DEA-agent Enrique Camarena in 1985, and the initial negotiations of the North
American Free Trade Agreement in 1990 (Chabat, 2010). Subsequently, several kingpins were
arrested during the presidential sexeniums of Salinas, Zedillo, and Fox (1989-2006). Specifically,
the incarceration of Miguel Angel Felix Gallardo, the Mexican godfather, in 1989, changed the
industrial organization of drug-trafficking services for decades to come (Chabat, 2010).
Second, cocaine-trafficking routes shifted to Mexico (“balloon effect”) after the United States
blocked the narrower Caribbean-trafficking corridor in the 1980s and early 1990s (Toro, 1995).
This change in cocaine trafficking routes, and increasing enforcement efforts by the Colombian
government —like the impeachment of corrupted politicians—, allowed Mexican DTOs to capture
quasi-rents from Colombian drug cartels (Chabat, 2010). Soon, towards the end of the 1990s,
Mexican DTOs became increasingly militarized and expanded their presence to many parts of
Mexico (Valdés-Castellanos, 2013). Thanks to their newly acquired military capabilities, several
Mexican DTOs like Loz Zetas and La Familia diversified their criminal enterprises into extortion,
kidnapping, motor vehicle theft, and human-trafficking activities (Valdés-Castellanos, 2013).
Third, Mexico’s democratization process decentralized political power and made it impossible
to negotiate effectively with DTOs (Osorio, 2012). Furthermore, institutional reforms to the justice
system —like the creation of the Mexican Intelligence Agency (CISEN) in 1989 and the National
Executive Committee for Public Safety in 1995— transformed criminal enforcement practices in
the country (Chabat, 2010). Mexico locked its political system into democracy with the election of
42Operation Condor tumbled Mexico’s share of U.S.-bound heroin and marijuana from a record high of 80% to a
low of 20%, although only for a short period of time (Toro, 1995).
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Vicente Fox, the first president not to belong to the hegemonic political party, PRI. Nonetheless,
this democratization process left severe power vacuums, for which DTOs competed. Consequently,
drug-related violence increased across Mexico, although at very controllable levels; in fact, homi-
cide rates for the population at large were at a historical low.
2.1.2 Joint Operations and the Spike in Drug-Related Violence
By the time Calderon took power, he faced a security threat of medium dimensions. Hence, soon
after receiving complaints about the expansion in the activities of DTOs by the governors of Mi-
choacan, Baja California, and Guerrero, he opted for sending Mexico’s military forces out to the
streets. In particular, Calderon’s military strategy sought to capture kingpins from all DTOs. Since
the federal government tried to pursue this goal in conjunction with the local governments, the
military strategy became known as “joint operations” (JOs). However, because of politics, the
federal government seldom coordinated with local enforcement agencies, many times taking over
local public safety duties, permanently. For the rest of this chapter, I use the terms “Mexican Drug
War”, “military strategy”, and “JOs”, interchangeably.
In total, 11 out of the 32 Mexican states had a statewide JO at some point during the period
2006-2012. These states are Baja California, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Durango, Guerrero, Michoa-
can, Morelos, Nuevo Leon, Sinaloa, Tamaulipas, and Veracruz. Overall, the military strategy was
very successful at accomplishing its target: Only 11 out of the 37 most wanted drug-lords were
still at large by the end of Calderon’s administration.
However, the decapitation of DTOs caused a “hydra effect.” According to Guerrero (2011), the
number of DTOs went from six to 16 during Calderon’s presidency. This hydra effect responded
to the organizational structure of the Mexican DTOs. Contrary to the Colombian Cartels and
the Italian Mafia, the Mexican DTOs had a cellular organization rather than a vertical structure.
That is, the Mexican DTOs were very much like a horizontal merger of enterprises or franchises,
working within the same line-of-business in different Mexican states. The leader of the DTO
coordinated and held together all corresponding cells, while managing international contracts for
36
the transportation and final processing of drugs such as cocaine from Colombia and ephedrine from
China.
For instance, the Sinaloa DTO, led by Joaquin Guzman, contained within its organization at
least 12 different cells, operating in nine different states: “Gente Nueva” in Sinaloa, “Los Mexi-
cles” in Chihuahua, “El Tigre” in Baja California, “Los Mata-Zetas” in Veracruz, and others. Once
the leader of the DTO fell from the structure, turf wars erupted within and across DTOs to gain
control of the trafficking-routes and major cities (“plazas”).
Existing empirical evidence suggests that the Mexican Drug War had a significant effect on
violence. Using a propensity score matching estimator, Merino (2011) concludes that the JOs
caused 12,046 (52.4%) additional drug-related homicides between 2007 and 2010. By applying a
regression discontinuity design on electoral results, Dell (2011) also finds supportive evidence for
this causal hypothesis, with a very similar magnitude in municipalities that have a strong presence
of DTOs (53.0%).43 Last, Calderon et al. (2012) expand these findings by running a difference-
in-difference regression with time-varying unobservable controls of intentional homicide rates on
drug-lord and drug-lieutenant arrests. Their results show a temporary treatment effect as high as
46.9%.
Notwithstanding the unintended consequences of the Mexican Drug War, there would still have
been a significant increase in drug-related homicides because of two foreign exogenous confound-
ing events. First, the 2004 expiration of the U.S. Federal Assault Weapons Ban (AWB): which,
according to Chicoine (2011) and Dube et al. (2013), made semi-automatic weapons more acces-
sible to DTOs in Mexican states along the U.S. border, except for Baja California. These authors
conclude that easier access to semi-automatic weapons had a marginal effect on intentional homi-
cide rates within the range of 16.4% to 21.0% for the years 2005 and 2006, prior to the beginning
of the Mexican Drug War.
The second foreign confounding event is an increase of cocaine seizure rates in Colombia,
which became significantly larger beginning in 2006. More cocaine seizure in Colombia (less
43Dell (2011) uses variation in electoral results for municipalities where PAN, Calderon’s political party, barely
won, and where more federal enforcement assistance occurred at the beginning of the Mexican Drug War.
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supply) led to higher revenues because of an inelastic demand for illicit drugs in the U.S. (Castillo
et al., 2013). Subsequently, DTOs fought against each other to gain control over those additional
revenues. According to Castillo et al., around 17.1% of all homicides can be explained by cocaine
seizure rates in Colombia. Yet, the existing literature emphasizes Calderon’s military strategy as
the main driver of the variation in drug-related violence.
2.2 Identification Strategy
The primary objective of this chapter is to estimate the effect of the Mexican Drug War on eco-
nomic development for treated states. Therefore, first, I identify a continuous proxy for the Mex-
ican Drug War to describe its economic impact, thoroughly. A proper continuous proxy gathers
variation in timing and intensity of treatment.
I exploit the rollout in the government’s implementation of statewide JOs as the most direct
measurement for the timing of treatment. Table 2.1 contains a timeline for all statewide JOs im-
plemented during Calderon’s administration. Evidently, Calderon launched some of these JOs as
early as just days after assuming office in December 2006, and as late as weeks shy from leaving
office in December 2012.
However, the rollout in the implementation of the JOs does not capture the intensity of the
Mexican Drug War across treated states. To measure treatment intensity, I use data from Mexico’s
Freedom of Information Act System on statewide interception operations conducted by the Mexi-
can Army.44 These operations include cargo and fugitive interceptions in highways, ports, streets,
and international bridges. Table 2.1 shows basic statistics on these interception operations.
Although the Army conducted a few interception operations prior to the Mexican Drug War, the
number of these operations increased by tenfold during Calderon’s administration. Most important,
the nature of these operations was radically different after the implementation of the Mexican Drug
War. For instance, the Army began using unconstitutional check-points, sophisticated detection
technology (e.g. industrial ion scanners), and a larger number of soldiers traveling in convoys.
44Tracking file identification number in the Freedom of Information Act System is 0000700008513.
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Table 2.1: Drug-Related Violence and Timing and Intensity of Treatment (2007-2012)
Average (max.) rate p/ 100,000 inh. 2007-2012†
State Month/Year Army Operations Drug-Related Homicides
Michoacan? January, 2007 0.10 (0.15) 11.67 (14.74)
Baja California January, 2007 0.02 (0.03) 20.35 (34.04)
Guerrero January, 2007 0.05 (0.12) 33.95 (54.31)
Nuevo Leon January, 2008 0.06 (0.13) 12.64 (30.18)
Tamaulipas January, 2008 0.08 (0.19) 13.19 (27.89)
Sinaloa January, 2008 0.14 (0.22) 38.63 (67.71)
Chihuahua April, 2008 0.12 (0.18) 78.94 (153.88)
Durango May, 2008 0.12 (0.25) 28.72 (48.01)
Coahuila September, 2011 0.07 (0.21) 11.74 (27.26)
Veracruz October, 2011 0.06 (0.17) 3.87 (7.02)
Morelos May, 2012 0.06 (0.18) 12.24 (23.28)
All Average 2008 0.08 24.18
†Data for Military Operations comes from the Freedom of Information Act System.
Data for drug-related homicides comes from the Bureau of Health Statistics (SINAIS).
? Michoacan’s JO initiated on December 11th, 2006, being reinforced in January, 2007.
Given these fundamental differences in the nature of interception operations after the beginning
of the conflict, the interaction between the rollout of JOs and the rate of interception operations
constitutes my continuous proxy for the Mexican Drug War. According to the existing literature
(Dell, 2011; Guerrero, 2011; Merino, 2011; Calderon et al., 2012), war-intensity variation, inter-
acted with the rollout of JOs, should explain differences in drug-related violence. To verify the
reliability of my continuous proxy, I run ordinary least squares (OLS) and fixed-effects regres-
sions on drug-related homicide rates for treated states, for the period 2007-2012.45 I approximate
drug-related homicides using the mortality databases from Mexico’s Bureau of Health Statistics
(SINAIS). In particular, I track leading causes of death associated to drug-related violence (e.g.
murder by hanging, murder by gunshot, and murder by mutilation). Compared to official records
of drug-related homicides from Mexican Intelligence Agencies (available from 2007 to 2010,)
45I control for the identified confounding factors (a dummy for AWB-bordering states and cocaine seizure rates in
Colombia). Some models also include the first-lag value of the dependent variable to account for dynamic tendency
and simultaneity. For the model with state dummies and the first-lag value of the dependent variable, I use Arellano
and Bond’s generalized method of moments procedure (see Angrist and Pischke, 2009; ch.5.)
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SINAIS data seem to approximate rather accurately drug-related homicides. The last row of Table
2.1 presents basic statistics of drug-related homicide rates for all treated state.
Table B.1 in the Appendix section indicates that, on average, the Mexican Drug War explains
as much as 30.8% of the variation in drug-related homicide rates, during the course of the con-
flict.46 Although smaller in magnitude than for previous chapters, these findings are consistent
with the conclusions of the existing literature. Differences in point-estimation most likely come
from endogeneity biases, a smaller sample (e.g. state vs municipality level), and the exclusion of
operations conducted by the Federal Police and the Mexican Navy.
Finally, for a valid identification strategy, I must verify orthogonality between the outcome of
interest and the assignment of treatment. In other words, I must make sure that the JOs did not
take place in the poorest Mexican states. Otherwise, my estimations would be biased because
the treatment coefficient would pick up unobservable institutional factors that determine economic
development, like corrupt institutions.
Figure 2.1: Discrete Evidence for the Orthogonality in the Assignment of Treatment
Fortunately, Figure 2.1 depicts clear discrete evidence for the orthogonality between pre-treatment
GDP per capita and the assignment of treatment. Seven out of the 11 treated states had GDP per
capita values above the national median prior to the conflict.47 Only Guerrero, Michoacan, More-
los, and Veracruz had pre-treatment GDP per capita values below the national median.
Similarly, before the beginning of the Mexican Drug War, six out of the 11 treated states had
corrupt public institutions, based on the median bribery-index from the National Survey of Cor-
46Both confounding factors move in the predicted direction.
47I exclude Campeche and Tabasco from the sample because both economies are highly dependent on oil-drilling
activity revenues, which belong to the federation (see below.)
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ruption and Good Governance.48 Not surprisingly, corrupt treated states, with the exception of
Durango (marginally rich) and Nuevo Leon, were also “poor” treated states. The previous indi-
cates that DTOs were located in states with easy access to trafficking routes rather than in poorer
states with corrupt institutions, exclusively (Dell, 2011).
Table B.2 in the Appendix section expand this evidence on treatment orthogonality, using con-
tinuous indicators for treatment, pre-treatment GDP per capita, and pre-treatment corruption lev-
els. All models in Table B.2 correspond to OLS estimators. Clearly, neither pre-treatment GDP per
capita nor pre-treatment corruption are good predictors for the assignment, timing, and intensity of
treatment.
2.3 Empirical Design
2.3.1 Synthetic Control Methods
A reliable continuous proxy for treatment, and orthogonality in its assignment, allow me to es-
timate the effect of the Mexican Drug War on GDP per capita for treated states. Being this a
comparative case study at an aggregate level, with few units in the universe, the empirical design
consists of synthetic control methods (SCMs). In the context of Rubin’s model for inferential
causality, SCMs use the scientific solution to solve for the Fundamental Problem of Causal Infer-
ence (FPCI).49 Contrary to the statistical solution to the FPCI, the scientific solution depend on
unit homogeneity between treated and control units, rather than on the independence assumption
(Holland, 1986).50
Hence, under the scientific solution to the FPCI, the economic impact of the Mexican Drug
War (Gs,t) for state s at year t is simply the difference between the GDP per capita of state s
with a JO (Y Ts,t) and the outcome of the identical untreated state (Y
C
s,t), so long as there are no
48Corruption rates are based on bribery frequency to obtain local public services (e.g. pay traffic violations, property
registration, etc.), as measured by the 2001, 2003, and 2005 National Survey of Corruption and Good Governance.
49“It is impossible to observe the value[s] of [...] [treatment] and [control] on the same unit, and therefore, it is
impossible to observe the effect” of whatever is being measure (Holland, 1984).
50Because of the low number of units in the universe, and the absence of randomization, is inappropriate to assume
independence (e.g. common trends) across units, over time.
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exogenous confounding factors driving the same causal mechanism (e.g. the expansion of drug-
related violence):
Gs,t = Y Ts,t−Y
C
s,t . (2.1)
To accomplish unit homogeneity between treatment and control states, SCMs rely on economic
theory and enough data variation from a pool of donor states, not exposed to treatment. Without
loss of generality, assume that there are j donor states that can be observed for T years, and that




be a vector of non-negative
weights that sum to one, where the components of the vector represent the weights assigned to
each of the donor states.51 Choosing a value of W creates a synthetic control for one particular
treated state.
Abadie et al. (2003) suggest a two-step optimization procedure to find the weights that ac-
complish unit homogeneity. In particular, their procedure consists in minimizing the following
equation for each of the treated states:
(Xs−X0W ) ′V (Xs−X0W ) , (2.2)
where Xs and X0 are vectors of pre-war characteristics for treated unit s and all donor states,
respectively; and V is a symmetric, positive semidefinite matrix that assigns a relative-importance
factor to each of the outcome predictors. These authors solve equation (2.2) conditional on V ,










f or t ∈ {1, ...,T0} . (2.3)
In theory, Abadie et al. (2003) show that if the synthetic control resembles closely a given
51Weights are constraint to positive values between zero and one (inclusive); hence, there is no extrapolation (Abadie
et al., 2003).
42
treated state prior to treatment, then these same weights (W ?) can be used after period T0 to estimate





w?i Ys,t f or t ∈ {T0 +1, ...,T} . (2.4)
Evidently, equation (2.4) resolves in an effect with an upward bias if the counterfactual of a treated
unit is underestimated, and vice-versa (Abadie et al., 2010). In practice, it is hard to find a perfect
weight vector such that the MSPE is exactly equal to zero. As matter of fact, the fitting could be
poor, in which case Abadie et al. (2010) advise against using SCMs.
Finally, since there are at least two identified confounding factors that simultaneously provoked
the expansion of drug-related violence, equation (2.4) estimates the effect of the total expansion in
drug-related violence on GDP per capita. This is not a problem for the overall results because the
confounding factors are exogenous.52 Most important, the continuous proxy for the Mexican Drug
War helps to uncover causality once a proper counterfactual becomes available.
2.3.2 Data and Case Implementation
For the current comparative case study, the outcome of interest (Y ) is GDP per capita. Observed
covariates (X) are population density, gross fixed assets, economic sectoral shares, and human
capital. I average the aforementioned variables over the matching period: 1993-2003, except for
population density, which only contains the value for 2003. Additionally, I augment these variables
by including the level of GDP per capita in 2003. This economic growth model, borrowed from
Barro and Xavier Sala-i-Martin’s (1995) work, is practically identical to the one used by Abadie
et al. (2003). One important thing to notice is that the matching period for all treated states
(1993-2003) stops four years before the beginning of the Mexican Drug War (2007) to avoid stiffer
restrictions due to confounding shocks (the 2004 expiration of the U.S. Federal AWB), as well as
potential spillover effects that may damage estimations otherwise.
52In the presence of negative spillovers from the two identified confounding factors on donor units, the effect of the
Mexican Drug War on GDP per capita is a strict lower bound.
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Disaggregate GDP data at the state level comes from Mexico’s National Institute of Statistics
and Geography (INEGI). This data is available from 1993 to 2012.53 Records for gross fixed
assets belong to the 1993, 1998, and 2003 economic census conducted by INEGI.54 Population
estimations for all years also come from INEGI. Moreover, I calculate human capital by state, for
individuals older than 15 years of age, based on records from the Ministry of Education (SEP) and
from INEGI.55 Human capital data is available yearly from 1993 to 2012.
To build synthetic controls for all treated states, I use 19 of the 21 states (including the Federal
District) from the donor pool, because two donor units (Campeche and Tabasco) have economies
that depend on over 65% of their GDP in oil-drilling activity revenues, which belong to the federa-
tion. Relying on donor’s data variation and on the outcome predictors above, I construct synthetic
controls for all of the 11 treated units. In addition, I run iteratively the two-step optimization pro-
cedure on all donor states to obtain synthetic controls for fitting assessment and causal inference
uses.56
Serving as an example, Table 2.2 reports the pre-treatment values of the outcome predictors for
Chihuahua, its synthetic control, and the average of all donors states. Indeed, synthetic controls
outperform simple averages of donor states at accomplishing unit homogeneity. To save space, I
do not report the matching period characteristics for all other treated states; however, an identical
conclusion can be drawn from the rest of the treated states.57
53There are two different GDP series: one that runs from 1993 to 2006, and another series that runs from 2003 to
2012. The latter series includes detailed regional measurements and new economic activities like agricultural services,
oil and gas drilling, oil-related construction, land division services, new manufacturing divisions, as well as new
tourism services, just to mention a few. This study uses the 2003-base series, and makes some adjustments to calculate
the GDP for the earlier series.
54I use gross fixed assets instead of gross total investment because the latter variable is not available for Mexico at
the state level. Gross fixed assets include only those productive assets with a durability higher than one-year.
55To build human capital variables by state, I apply Mas’s (1995) methodology: Hr,t =Hr,t−1+Er,t +Or,t +δr,tHr,t−1,
where Hr,t is the level of schooling in state r, at time t; Er,t is the inflow of the adult population with the same level
of education; Or,t is the outflow of individuals moving to a higher level of schooling; and δr,t is the morality rate at a
certain level of education. INEGI provides the baseline levels and mortality rates by education, while the Ministry of
Education (SEP) reports schooling inflows and outflows.
56I use the the nested optimization method to build all synthetic controls, with the exception of Distrito Federal,
Nuevo Leon, Quintana Roo, Tamaulipas, Tlaxcala, and Veracruz, which show no improvement, or no available convex
combination, over the data-driven regression based method.
57Matching period characteristics for all other treated states are available from the author upon request.
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Table 2.2: Matching Period Characteristics for Chihuahua, Synthetic Chihuahua, and Donor Units
Chihuahua Synthetic Chihuahua Mexico1
Real GDP per capitaa 18604.90 18603.78 15556.32
Population Densityb 12.86 545.19 420.4
Gross Fixed Assetsc 27.61 29.70 35.05
Sectoral Shares (%)d
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing 6.30 5.87 5.94
Energy, Mining, and Construction 10.18 10.18 10.98
Manufacturing Industry 28.14 23.26 19.20
Marketable Services 33.41 39.33 41.10
Nonmarketable Services 21.97 21.36 22.78
Human Capital (%)e
Illiterates 5.18 8.67 10.81
Primary (0th-6th) 44.01 41.22 41.42
Secondary (7th-12th) 40.66 39.85 38.09
Higher Education (+12th) 10.15 10.26 9.68
1 Excluding all treated states, Campeche, and Tabasco.
a GDP per capita in 2003, (1993) Mexican Pesos.
b Persons per square kilometer, 2003.
c Average gross fixed assets as percentage of the GDP for 1993, 1998, and 2003.
d Average percentage share of the GDP for the matching period 1993-2003.
e Mean percentage of working population (15+) for the matching period 1993-2003.
2.3.3 Normalization and Sample Selection
For comparability purposes, I calculate the normalized mean square prediction error (NMSPE) and
the normalized treatment effect (NˆG) as percentages of the GDP per capita from equations (2.3)






















f or t ∈ {T0 +1, ...,T} .
(2.5)
According to the distribution of the NMSPE, the economic model above proves to be a good
predictor of economic growth for many Mexican states. In particular, the yearly median value of
the NMSPE for the full sample (treated and donor units) during the matching period is equal to
7.6%. Unfortunately, not all treated states accomplish a strong fit during the matching period as to
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obtain a reliable counterfactual.
Certain treated states obtain NMSPEs above the full sample median, such as Baja California
(10.1%), Coahuila (8.1%), Morelos (7.7%), Nuevo Leon (15.9%), Tamaulipas (39.3%), and Ver-
acruz (10.0%). In stark contrast, Chihuahua (3.2%), Durango (3.9%), Guerrero (0.2%), Michoacan
(7.1%), and Sinaloa (2.0%) attain NMSPEs below the full sample median. Luckily for this paper,
the latter set of treated states experienced JOs early during Calderon’s administration, as well as
the highest rates of military operations and drug-related violence (see Table 2.1.)
For the sake of accuracy and brevity, I limit my discussion to Chihuahua, Durango, Guerrero,
Michoacan, and Sinaloa. Provided that the proportion of pre-treatment poor treated states remains
almost the same (e.g. 2 of 5 treated states), narrowing my analysis does not create a problem for
causal inference, as orthogonality in the assignment of treatment continues to hold. Moreover, I
emphasize the particular case of Chihuahua, because this state experienced homicide rates well
above all other states.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Effect of Drug-Related Violence on GDP Per Capita
Figures 2.2 and B.1 depict the results for those treated states with an accurate synthetic control. The
panels on the left in Figures 2.2 and B.1 plot the trajectory of the GDP per capita for Chihuahua,
Durango, Guerrero, Michoacan, Sinaloa, and their respective synthetic controls. Following equa-
tion (2.4), a simple visual comparison between treatment and synthetic control lines allows the
impact assessment of drug-related violence —provoked by the Mexican Drug War and the identi-
fied confounding factors— on GDP per capita, for each of the treated states. In normalized terms,
Chihuahua presents an outcome gap equal to −13.2%, Durango an outcome difference of −6.7%,
Guerrero an outcome division of −3.6%, Michoacan an outcome gap of −3.4%, and Sinaloa an
outcome difference of −3.6%.
Overall, the magnitude of the GDP per capita gap is directly proportional to the expansion of
drug-related violence, presented numerically in Table 2.1. To illustrate this causal relationship,
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Figure 2.2: GDP Per Capita Gap between Chihuahua and Synthetic Chihuahua
the right-hand side panels in Figures 2.2 and B.1 plot drug-related homicide rates from SINAIS
(shaded areas) and from the Mexican Intelligence Agencies (gray dashed-dotted lines), along with
the GDP per capita gap (solid line), obtained from the left-hand side panels. As mentioned above,
drug-related homicide rates from the Mexican Intelligence Agencies are only available from 2007
to 2010, and move rather closely to drug-related homicide rates from SINAIS.
For most treated states, these graphs show that the line for the GDP per capita gap descends
very slowly between 2004 and 2006, after the identified confounding factors begin to expand drug-
related violence. However, the GDP per capita gap only widens dramatically after the implemen-
tation of the JOs, when drug-related homicide rates spike. Furthermore, the GDP per capita gap
stabilizes after drug-related homicide rates fall. This is readily observable for Chihuahua, where
drug-related violence increases and falls drastically. To a lesser extent, this situation also occurs in
Durango and Sinaloa, albeit the fall in drug-related violence for these states is more gradual.
Conversely, Guerrero and Michoacan, the poorest states among the treated units, continue to
show increasing signs of drug-related violence beyond Calderon’s administration. This behavior
points to deeper governance issues (e.g. creation of paramilitary groups, political instability, etc.)
Consequently, the slope of the GDP per capita gap for Guerrero and Michoacan seems to keep
getting steeper. In line with the findings for the Basque and Italian conflict cases by Abadie et al.
(2003) and Pinotti (2012), respectively, the main effect of drug-related violence on GDP per capita
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in Mexico occurs with a one-year lag.
Robustness Tests To determine the sensitivity of the findings above, I conduct four robustness
tests. First, I expand the matching period up to the year prior to the rollout of the JOs, for each of the
treated states. This first robustness check provides additional information for the construction of
synthetic controls at the expense of spurious causal and inferential conclusions, due to the presence
of confounding factors and spillover effects.
Table 2.3: Robustness Tests: GDP Per Capita Gap (%) between Treated and Synthetic Control
Units
State Originala Matching Periodb Maximum Unitc Pre-Homicided Geographye
Chihuahua -13.20 -12.01 -11.93 -11.94 -14.89
Durango -6.73 -6.91 -6.43 -7.67 -10.99
Guerrero -3.59 -4.63 -4.57 -3.10 -3.09
Michoacan -3.37 -3.12 -3.22 -2.70 -5.81
Sinaloa -3.63 -2.23 1.65 -2.79 -3.63
Average -6.10 -5.78 -4.90 -5.64 -7.68
T-test (p)? - 0.510 0.327 0.282 0.140
?Ho: difference in means between models is indistinguishable from zero.
a Original model (see results above.)
b Sets the matching period from 1993 up to year prior to the rollout of the JO.
c Drops the donor unit with the highest weight from the donor pool.
d Adds per capita homicide rates to the original set of matching covariates (X).
e Includes the density-distance to the nearest U.S. border bridge in the outcome predictors (X).
Second, I drop the donor unit with the highest weight from the donor pool for each of the treated
states, separately. This falsification test studies whether state-specific effects are only driven by one
single donor unit. Nevertheless, when conducting this robustness check, the value of the MSPE in
equation (2.3) necessarily increases because the optimal set of weights (W ?) becomes unavailable
by construction. For instance, Sinaloa’s MSPE increases by half after dropping the principal donor
unit from the optimal vector of weights (W ?). Table 2.B.3 in the Appendix section presents the
synthetic weights for treated states with an accurate synthetic control.
Third, I add drug-related homicide rates to the set of outcome predictors (X). This robustness
check incorporates potentially endogenous structural trends of drug-related homicide rates. Simi-
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larly, I include an indicator of the average density-distance to the nearest U.S. border bridge in the
set of matching covariates (X). This test seeks to control for the presence of DTOs, which tend to
locate closer to the U.S. border, along the drug-trafficking routes.
Table 2.3 shows the results for all four robustness tests. Overall, the original model is robust
to different checks. Statistically-speaking, all t-tests fail to reject the null hypothesis of a zero
difference in the average of the treatment effects across models. The previous brings confidence to
the original economic model, as well as to the results obtained thus far.
2.4.2 Inference: Placebo Studies
As in most comparative case studies, the small number of treated states in the universe and the ab-
sence of randomization do not allow the application of large sample inferential techniques. These
limitations are common when using the scientific solution to the FPCI, as opposed to the statistical
solution. Therefore, to statistically validate my findings, I apply a couple of “placebo” studies,
based on the results of running iteratively the two-step matching procedure on all donor units
(previously performed above to obtain the median value of the NMSPE for the full sample.)
The set of synthetic controls for donor units allows to construct placebo effects by taking the
outcome difference between untreated states and their respective synthetic controls. As previously
suggested by Abadie et al. (2010), the distribution of placebo effects can be used for the statistical
assessment of the treatment effects: If treated states are outliers in the placebo distribution, then
the treatment effects are statistically significant (Abadie et al., 2010).
Figure 2.3 presents the results for the first placebo test, which consists in comparing the treat-
ment distribution against the placebo distribution, at one point in time during treatment. For this
inferential exercise, I drop all donor (and treated) states that attain a matching period NMSPE
above the full sample median (7.6%), because these units do not provide reliable information. All
gray, solid lines represent placebo effects; while dark, dashed lines depict treatment effects. I em-
phasize the GDP per capita gap for Chihuahua using a solid line. The shaded area in Figure 2.2
indicates the treatment period.
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Figure 2.3: GDP per Capita Gap for Donor and Treated States with an Accurate Synthetic Control
(MSPE<Median)
Seemingly, all treatment effects in this panel show an odd, negative behavior within the shaded
area, in comparison to the placebo effects. By the end of the treatment period in 2012, five of the
nine lowest GDP per capita gap lines are treated states. However, the binomial probability of this
combination, under equal likelihood of outcomes, is only 9!5!×4!×29 = 0.246, which does not let me
infer causality on all of the treated states together, at conventional levels of confidence.
The second iterative placebo test builds p-values from the distribution of post/pre-treatment
MSPE ratios to evaluate individually the significance of the treatment effects. I obtain the post-
treatment MSPE from the squared values in equation (2.4). This placebo study includes those
treated units with an accurate counterfactual, as well as all donor states.
Figure 2.4 presents the distribution of the post/pre-treatment MSPE ratios. The left panel plots
those treated exposed to JOs in 2007, whereas the right panel shows states that became treated in
2008. For consistency, the placebo treatment period corresponds to the respective base year of the
JOs in each of the panels.
Clearly, both distributions are skewed to the left, with the vast majority of donor states having
ratios below 5. Conversely, Chihuahua, Durango, and Guerrero are all outliers in the distribution of
ratios. Specifically, Chihuahua and Guerrero have the highest ratios at 19 and 43, respectively. The
previous means that, under randomization, the probability of obtaining the highest ratio for either
Chihuahua or Guerrero is 120 = 0.05. Consequently, the treatment effects for both of these states
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Figure 2.4: Distribution of Post/Pre Treatment MSPE Ratios by Rollout of JOs (2007 and 2008)
meet the conventional 5% level of confidence. The same logic applies to Durango, although this
state presents an effect that is only statistically significant at the 10% level of confidence: 220 = 0.10.
Finally, I cannot claim that findings for Michoacan and Sinaloa are statistically significant because
neither of these treated states are outliers in the distribution of the post/pre-treatment MSPE ratios.
2.4.3 Causation: Effect of the Mexican Drug War on GDP Per Capita
Thus far, I have established that a spike in drug-related violence, driven partly by the Mexican Drug
War, had an effect on the economy in those states where the federal government implemented JOs.
Using placebo studies, I have also proven that, once treated, said effect is statistically significant for
the majority of the treated states that display an accurate synthetic control. Moreover, in Section
1, I have acknowledged that the spike in drug-related violence was simultaneously provoked by
two foreign confounding factors: the 2004 expiration of the U.S. Federal AWB, and a significant
increase of cocaine seizure rates in Colombia after 2006. Therefore, the exogenous effect of drug-
related violence on GDP per capita has not all come as a consequence of the Mexican Drug War.
To determine the direct causal effect of the Mexican Drug War on economic development, I
run OLS on the variation of the normalized GDP per capita gap for the treated sample. Namely,
the central model to evaluate the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) is the following:
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NˆGs,t = α+θ NˆGs,t−1 +βJOs,t−1 + γZs,t−1 + εs,t , (2.6)
where NˆGs,t is the normalized GDP per capita gap, in percentage terms; NˆGs,t−1 is the lagged
dependent variable, which controls for tendency; JOs,t−1 is the lag value of my continuous proxy
for the Mexican Drug War, the interaction term between the rollout of the JOs and the rate of in-
terception operations; Zs,t−1 is a vector with the lag values of the two aforementioned confounding
factors —the interaction between the 2004 expiration of the U.S. Federal AWB and a dummy for
AWB-bordering states (Chicoine, 2011; Dube et al., 2013), and cocaine seizure rates in Colom-
bia (Castillo et al., 2012); and εs,t are all other unobservables that influence the outcome. The
coefficient of interest in equation (2.6) is β .
Alternatively, I include state fixed effects (λs) in equation (2.6) to control for possible systemic
biases in the (normalized) GDP per capita gap, generated by the SCMs:
NˆGs,t = λs +θ NˆGs,t−1 +βJOs,t−1 + γZs,t−1 + εs,t . (2.7)
However, the conditions for consistently estimating equation (2.7) are more complicated than
OLS because, once state dummies are introduced, the error term (εs,t) becomes necessarily corre-
lated with the lagged dependent variable (NˆGs,t−1). Following Angrist and Pischke (2009; ch.5),
I apply Arellano and Bond’s generalized method of moments procedure (ABGMM), which uses
higher-lag values of the dependent variable as instruments, to solve for serial correlation.
Finally, I run an additional two-stage least squares (2SLS) model in which the indicator for
the Mexican Drug War (JOt−1), along with the two identified confounding variables (Zt−1), enter
equation (2.6) indirectly through exogenous drug-related violence:
NˆGs,t = α+θ NˆGs,t−1 +δ phomicidesgap s,t−1 + εs,t
homicidesgap s,t−1 = αF +θF NˆGs,t−1 +piJOs,t−1 + γZs,t−1 +νs,t−1,
(2.8)
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where phomicidesgap is the gap in drug-related homicide rates between treated and synthetic
control units. In this specification, the parameter of interest is pi×δ .
Established the mechanics of the minimization procedure in equations (2.2) and (2.3), I limit
my sample observations from the end of the matching period onwards (2003-2012). I run equations
(2.6), (2.7), and (2.8) for all treated states with a reliable synthetic control (Chihuahua, Durango,
Guerrero, Michoacan, and Sinaloa), as well as for only those treated states that report a statistically
significant GDP per capita gap (Chihuahua, Durango, and Guerrero). All together, my sample
contains, at the most, 50 observations. Hence, equation (2.6) is more likely to provide the true
ATT because OLS is consistent and unbiased for small samples, whereas the ABGMM and 2SLS
estimators are only consistent in small-sample asymptotics (Angrist and Pischke, 2009; ch.4).
Table 2.4 presents the main results for the effect of the Mexican Drug War on GDP per capita
gap, in percentage units. Columns 1 to 3 show the estimations for all treated units that have
an accurate synthetic control, whereas columns 4 to 6 reduce the sample to treated states with a
statistically significant GDP per capita gap. The last row in Table 2.4 presents the ATT of the
Mexican Drug War on GDP per capita gap, in percentage terms. For most specifications, the
coefficients for the Mexican Drug War and the confounding factors are statistically significant and
move in the correct direction. What is more, there is little variation across estimators, implying no
need for state dummies.
Given the properties of OLS and the number of states represented in the sample, my preferred
specification is column 1. This specification explains around 69.1% of the outcome variation,
and indicates a statistically significant ATT equal to -0.7% for Chihuahua, Durango, Guerrero,
Michoacan, and Sinaloa, over the period 2003-2012. The 95% confidence interval of the ATT,
under robust standard errors, is in the range of -1.4% and 0.4%. If there are zero spillovers,
and a perfect linear relationship between the Mexican Drug War and GDP per capita, then an
extrapolation of the ATT on all treated states amounts to a loss in GDP per capita equal to 0.5%,
over the period 2003-2012. Given the share of treated states in Mexico’s economy (over one-third),
this is a considerable effect for a single policy, which partially explains the poor performance of
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Table 2.4: Average Effect of the Mexican Drug War on GDP Per Capita Gap (%) between Treated
States and Synthetic Controls (2003-2012)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS ABGMM 2SLS OLS ABGMM 2SLS
L p/Drug Homicide Gap -0.097*** -0.102***
(0.019) (0.028)
L Roll x Intercep Ops -10.366* -11.604*** -18.078*** -18.949**
(5.494) (3.912) (6.402) (7.891)
L Colombia Seizures -0.016 -0.006 -0.007 -0.000
(0.010) (0.005) (0.013) (0.004)
L Border x AWB -1.999** -2.105*** -1.730** -1.726***
(0.864) (0.585) (0.785) (0.438)
L p/GDP Gap 0.605*** 0.572*** 0.251** 0.659*** 0.645*** 0.282
(0.115) (0.159) (0.125) (0.123) (0.059) (0.199)
FIRST-STAGE
L Roll x Intercep Ops 125.944*** 186.172***
(34.312) (70.983)
L Colombia Seizures 0.003 -0.023
(0.062) (0.100)
L Border x AWB 25.35** 20.257**
(9.733) (9.103)
L p/GDP Gap -3.573*** -3.671***
(1.114) (01.296)
Restricted Sample No No No Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.691 0.710 0.828 0.795
Number of States 5 5 5 3 3 3
Observations 50 50 50 30 30 30
F-Stat Excluded Var 10.9 6.0
Drug War ATT (p.) -0.70 -0.77 -0.82 -1.11 -1.16 -1.16
Notes: All regressions contain robust standard errors in parentheses.
Connotations *, **, and *** mean significant at the 90 p., 95 p. and 99 p. level of confidence.
Mexico’s economy during Calderon’s administration.
2.5 Determinants
All of these results remain silent about the economic determinants by which the Mexican Drug
War hampered economic development. Recent literature in the matter suggests a significant effect
of the Mexican Drug War on the labor market. Specifically, the conflict provoked a fall of 1.5%
in female labor participation rates, and a wage reduction for male workers in the informal sector
equal to 2.3% (Dell, 2011). By the same token, BenYishay and Pearlman (2013) find a decrease in
hours-worked equal to one unit per week as a consequence of the Mexican Drug War.
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However, there is not any further empirical evidence on other possibly affected variables. In
what follows, I measure the effect of the Mexican Drug War on two unexplored determinants
for economic development: consumption and productive investment. Both of these variables are
components of the GDP accounting equation, and contribute to economic growth by means of
further production (Barro and Xavier Sala-i-Martin, 1995).
2.5.1 Consumption
The first potentially affected determinant for economic development is consumption. The logic
for a possible decline in consumption as the result of the Mexican Drug War is as follows: If
households become victims of drug-related violence, either directly through organized crime or
indirectly through fear, then they are likely to hedge their exposure against further violence. Ratio-
nal households may do so by changing their consumption behavior. In particular, households may
avoid “risky consumption” activities like going out at night to have fun, or taking public transporta-
tion. These possible changes in consumption patterns erode the domestic market because economic
resources, previously allocated to “risky consumption,” are never spent in the same manner.
Figure 2.5: Mechanism for the Effect of the Mexican Drug War on “Risky” Consumption, for
Chihuahua and Synthetic Chihuahua
To test for a decline in consumption, I use nine different cross-sectional waves of the Mexican
Crime Victimization Survey, gathered by Mexico’s Citizen Security Institute (ICESI) and INEGI.
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Most of these surveys contain a representative sample of Mexico.58 In addition, I collect aggregate
records for local savings from Mexico’s Federal Banking Regulator (CNBV) and the Central Bank
of Mexico (BANXICO) to approximate aggregate consumption per capita, which is not available
at the state level.59 This information, together with the previously obtained weights (W ?) from
equations (2.2) and (2.3), allow me to build a panel database for treated states and their respec-
tive synthetic controls,60 containing the mean victimization cost, fear for personal safety, average
changes in “risky consumption”, and savings per capita (as a measure of aggregate consumption
per capita.)
Figures 2.5 and B.2 present graphically the mechanism for a potential drop in consumption, for
treated states with a reliable synthetic control. The left panels include the pooled mean victimiza-
tion cost of extortion, kidnapping, and motor vehicle theft for treated and synthetic control units,
in 1993 Mexican Pesos (dashed lines). Similarly, the right panels plot fear for personal safety
(shaped-lines) and changes in “risky consumption” activities like going out at night (darkest lines),
both as percentages of the population.
Clearly, mean victimization cost and fear for personal safety increases radically for all treated
states, in relation to synthetic controls. Because households internalize directly and indirectly drug-
related violence, “risky consumption” (e.g. going out at night) decreases. Immediately visible is
the strong dynamic relation between fear for personal safety and “risky consumption.”
Table 2.5 presents numeric evidence for the effect of the Mexican Drug War on mean vic-
timization cost gap, fear for personal safety gap, and savings per capita gap between treated and
synthetic control units. Specifically, I run equations (2.6) and (2.8) for the normalized values of
the aforementioned variables, in percentage terms. All specifications restrict the sample to those
58Specifically, ENSI-1 (2001) has a non-representative sample of 35,001 observations, ENSI-2 (2002) a non-
representative sample of 35,174 households, ENSI-3 (2004) a representative sample of 66,000 households, ENSI-5
(2007) a non-representative sample of 44,977 households, ENSI-6 (2008) a representative sample of 71,370 house-
holds, ENSI-7 (2009) a representative sample of 73,324 households, ENVIPE-1 (2010) a representative sample of
78,179 households, ENVIPE-2 (2011) a representative sample of 95,903 households, and ENVIPE-3 (2012) a repre-
sentative sample of 95,810 households. All surveys contain sampling weights.
59Aggregate savings per capita is inversely related to aggregate consumption per capita.
60Optimal weights for synthetic controls (W ?) should remain valid for the comparison of household’s aggregate
consumption because the economic model in Section 3 incorporates demographic variables like human capital and
population density.
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Table 2.5: Average Effect of the Mexican Drug War on Victimization Cost Gap (%), Fear for Safety
Gap (%), and Savings Rates Gap (%) between Treated States and Synthetic Controls (2003-2012)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
L p/Drug Homicide Gap 2.253* 9.030* 0.219*
(1.185) (5.452) (0.126)
L Roll x Intercep Ops 261.756 446.357 66.175**
(206.918) (2076.954) (30.079)
L Colombia Seizures 1.906* 0.673 -0.048
(1.082) (4.187) (0.095)
L Border x AWB 47.179 633.421* -18.089**
(37.229) (323.773) (8.134)
L Victim Cost Gap 0.046 0.076
(0.053) (0.064)
L Fear-Safe Gap 0.363*** 0.358***
(0.088) (0.082)
L p/Savings Gap 0.869*** 1.075***
(0.089) (0.074)
Dependent Var Cost Cost Fear-Safe Fear-Safe Savings Savings
R-squared 0.352 0.074 0.463 0.415 0.887 0.846
Observations 30 30 30 30 45 45
F-Stat Excluded Var 20.8 23.2 8.3
Drug War ATT (p.) 65.04 30.32 29.75 118.61 4.41 2.92
Notes: All regressions contain robust standard errors in parentheses. Mean victimization cost
and fear for personal safety are factored by inverse survey sampling weights. Connotations
*, **, and *** mean significant at the 90 p., 95 p. and 99 p. level of confidence.
treated states with a reliable synthetic control (Chihuahua, Durango, Guerrero, Michoacan, and
Sinaloa), for the non-matching period (2003-2012).61 For brevity, I exclude the first stage of the
2SLS estimator.
Findings indicate a statistically significant increase in mean victimization cost, although the
spike in “wealth losses” is not proportional to the expansion in drug-related violence. Conversely,
the percentage of the population feeling fearful for their personal safety in treated states increases
by twofold, compared to synthetic controls. Therefore, during treatment, households internalize
drug-related violence indirectly through fear, rather than directly through “wealth losses.” As a
result of an increase in mean victimization cost and fear, the gap in savings per capita between
treated states and synthetic controls increases by 4.4%, which means that aggregate consumption
per capita declines simultaneously.
61To control for tendency in mean victimization cost gap and fear for personal safety gap, I take the values from
2002 in lieu of 2003 because this latter year is not available in the Mexican Crime Victimization Survey.
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Extrapolating the results in Table 2.5 to all 11 treated states reduces the ATT on savings per
capita to 2.9%. Considering that savings and consumption rates during the pre-treatment period
(1993-2003) for all treated states are 12.6% and 68.3% of the GDP, respectively, the ATT of the
Mexican Drug War on aggregate consumption per capita is equal to -0.5%. This effect is propor-
tional to the effect of the Mexican Drug War on the GDP per capita.
2.5.2 Productive Investment
Another possibly affected determinant for economic development is productive investment. To
proxy for this determinant, I use data for commercial credit granted to businesses from CNBV and
BANXICO instead of gross domestic investment records, because the latter is not available yearly
at the state level. Even if commercial credit granted to businesses is not a perfect proxy for gross
domestic investments, the fraction of Mexico’s capital market controlled by commercial financial
intermediaries is crucial to the economy: According to the 2010 National Survey of Financial
Competitiveness, conducted by CNBV and the Inter-American Development Bank, about 33% of
all formal Mexican enterprises maintain banking loans at any point in time.62 Most important,
24% of total commercial credit granted to the businesses goes towards investment.
Established the influence of bank lending on private investment, I examine a potential decline
in commercial credit (non-consumption and non-mortgage) granted to the private sector as a con-
sequence of the Mexican Drug War. Bonaccorsi di Patti (2009) proposes two reasons for a decline
in commercial credit granted to businesses after a spike in drug-related violence: 1) The bank’s
inability to asses the quality of borrowers because of an uncertain propensity to victimization; and
2) a decrease in trust among parties in the domestic financial market.
The previous reasons do not apply to the local public sector because local governments can
ultimately be bailed out by the federal government (e.g. lender of last resort). Subsequently, credit
could move to the local public sector if the demand for it exists. Notwithstanding this possible
substitution effect, productive investment would still decline because public investment, in contrast
62As a caveat, the 2010 National Survey of Financial Competitiveness includes loans from development and foreign
banks, which hold less than 16% of the capital market.
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to private investment, has not been a productive input for GDP since 1982, when Mexico adopted
several privatization and decentralization reforms (see Ramirez, 2010.)
Table 2.6 contains the result for the effect of the Mexican Drug War on commercial credit (non-
consumption and non-mortgage) by sector. Using again the optimal weights (W ?) from above, I
run equations (2.6) and (2.8) for the gap in commercial credit per capita granted to the private
sector, the gap in commercial credit per capita granted to the public sector, and the gap in private-
to-total credit ratio between treated and synthetic control units, in normalized terms. Just as in
Tables 2.4 and 2.5, I limit my sample to those treated states with a reliable synthetic control, for
the period 2003-2012.
Table 2.6: Average Effect of the Mexican Drug War on the Gap in Commercial Credit Per Capita
Granted to the Private Sector (%), the Gap in Commercial Credit Per Capita Granted to the Public
Sector (%), and the Gap in Private-to-Total Credit Ratio (%) between Treated States and Synthetic
Controls (2003-2012)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
L p/Drug Homicide Gap -0.351* 0.659 -0.054
(0.208) (0.450) (0.116)
L Roll x Intercep Ops -37.775 83.970 20.186
(63.169) (154.758) (42.871)
L Colombia Seizures -0.004 -0.063 -0.167
(0.209) (0.422) (0.112)
L Border x AWB -19.582 44.751 -3.539
(14.806) (33.077) (5.552)
L Priv Credit Gap 0.799*** 0.808***
(0.111) (0.096)
L Pub Credit Gap 0.888*** 0.834***
(0.134) (0.126)
L Priv Ratio Gap 0.698*** 0.681***
(0.073) (0.069)
Dependent Var Priv Credit Priv Credit Pub Credit Pub Credit Priv Ratio Priv Ratio
R-squared 0.843 0.839 0.706 0.682 0.742 0.732
Observations 45 45 45 45 45 45
F-Stat Excluded Var 12.5 12.1 11.2
Drug War ATT (p.) -2.52 -4.92 5.60 9.42 1.35 -0.75
Notes: All regressions contain robust standard errors in parentheses.
Connotations *, **, and *** mean significant at the 90 p., 95 p. and 99 p. level of confidence.
The first two columns indicate a significant loss in commercial credit per capita granted to the
private sector as high as 4.9%, as consequence of the Mexican Drug War. Expanding these results
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to all treated states reduces the ATT to -3.2%. According to records from BANXICO and the World
Bank, commercial credit (non-consumption and non-mortgage) granted to businesses during the
pre-treatment period accounts for 6.4% of GDP, whereas private gross domestic investment during
the same period of time amounts to 18.5% of GDP.63 Provided that 24% of all commercial credit
granted to business goes towards investment, the ATT on productive investment for all treated states
is equal to -0.3%. This effect, however, does not account for any changes in privately owned-capital
investment.
Finally, there is a positive effect of the Mexican Drug War on commercial credit per capita
granted to the public sector, even though the ATT is not statistically different from zero. In fact,
there is little or no change on the private-to-total credit ratio, suggesting a null credit substitution
effect. All of these findings are consistent with the evidence for a lower access to credit in Italy as
a consequence of organized crime, found by Bonaccorsi di Patti (2009).
2.6 Conclusion
The main results in this chapter suggest a significant effect of the Mexican Drug War on GDP per
capita for treated states equal to -0.5%, over the period 2003-2012. Economic determinants by
which the Mexican Drug War hampered economic development include a proportional reduction
in consumption, and a decline in productive investment equal to 0.3%. This latter determinant is
driven by a drop of 3.2% on commercial credit (non-consumption and non-mortgage) per capita
granted to the private sector as a consequence of the military conflict.
The results above reinforce the criticism from many academics and human rights activists
against the military strategy implemented by President Calderon. Namely, President Calderon
should have been more prudent in using the Mexican Army to conduct activities that belong to the
police. Evidently, President Calderon did not calculate the unintended consequences of decapitat-
ing DTOs, prior to launching his military strategy. The negative outcomes of Mexico’s failed drug
war are palpable in the economy, as well as in the social fabric.
63These percentages are roughly equal across states.
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3 BREAKING SAD: DRUG-RELATED HOMICIDES AND
MENTAL WELL-BEING IN MEXICO
The level of violence recently exerted by Mexican drug-trafficking organizations (DTOs) sur-
passes that of many international armed conflicts. Decapitations, mass executions, and hanging of
bodies are now common events in many parts of Mexico (Bunker, Campbell, and Bunker, 2010).
Beyond any rhetoric from national and international media, drug-related violence has become a
visible phenomena in public spaces. Although expressions of drug-related violence have always
occurred sporadically in Mexico, the frequency and brutality of the violence that prevailed between
2007 and 2012 are incomparable to previous periods.
Such rates of violence, usually generated by war, are known to have a negative impact on
mental well-being. For instance, Scholte et al. (2004) find an immediate increase in depression
among Afghans after the launching of Bush’s “War on Terror.” Similarly, de Jong et al. (2003) and
Priebe et al. (2010) observe a long-lasting significant effect of war exposure on anxiety, depression,
and post-traumatic stress disorders for individuals living in Algeria, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Palestine,
and the former Yugoslavia.
This chapter is a first attempt to estimate the effect of drug-related violence on depression
among adults in Mexico, amid a conflict known as the “Mexican Drug War”.64 To infer causality,
the empirical design consists mainly of first-differences in aggregate health outcomes at the munic-
ipality level before and after the beginning of the conflict. In addition, I employ two time-varying
instrumental variables (e.g changes in net cocaine supply in municipalities with a drug-trafficking
route and differences in federal-local enforcement cooperation) to account for potential endogene-
64A recent working paper by Michaelsen (2012) analyzes the effect of mental health on labor outcomes between
2002 and 2005, using changes in state-level homicide rates as instrumental variables. Although Michaelsen’s approach
is novel, the first-stage in her analysis misses the spike in drug-related violence (2007-2012). In this paper, I focus
exclusively on the effect of drug-related violence on depression during the Mexican Drug War, while accounting for
potential endogeneity between drug-related violence and depression.
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ity issues.
Preliminary results suggest a statistical significant increase in clinical and non-clinical depres-
sion among women as consequence of drug-related violence. In stark contrast, men in Mexico
seem largely unaffected by drug-related violence as far as mental health outcomes concern. Future
versions of this paper will expand on explanations for gender difference in the treatment effect.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 1 describes the identification theory, and explains the
relevant features of the Mexican Drug War. Section 2 provides the foundations for the empirical
strategy to estimate the treatment effect. Section 3 presents preliminary results. Section 4 analyzes
the robustness of the suggested findings. Finally, Section 5 discusses the economic implications of
the preliminary results.
3.1 Identification Theory
3.1.1 Structural and Foreign Factors
Between 2004 and 2006, prior to the beginning of the conflict, Mexican DTOs expanded their
activities significantly, even though homicide rates were at a historical low. This expansion in drug-
trafficking activity was the result of several structural and foreign factors. Among the structural
factors, there were three important events that fostered organized crime before the launching of
Mexican Drug War.
First, U.S.-Mexico cooperation on law enforcement grew constantly after the murder of En-
rique Camarena, an American drug-enforcement agent, in 1985. As a result of this multilateral
cooperation, the Mexican government captured a few drug-lords. Even though these criminals
continued to conduct business as usual from Mexican jails, the intensification of law enforcement
began to change the industrial organization of drug-trafficking services towards more competition
(Toro, 1995). Second, during the early 1990s, the U.S. government boosted crackdowns on cocaine
shipments along the Caribbean-trafficking corridor (Toro, 1995), incentivizing cocaine-trafficking
routes to shift towards Mexico (the “balloon effect”). Third and last, after the election of Vicente
Fox in 2000, Mexico experienced a rapid democratization process, which left severe power vac-
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uums as political decisions became increasingly decentralized (Osorio, 2012). The absence of a
strong centralized State complicated a pax narcotica, the “explicit” coordination between DTOs
and the State to maintain drug-related violence to a minimum (Osorio, 2012).
Additionally, there were two foreign events that developed simultaneously over the structural
context. First, arguments on preserving the Second Amendment of the U.S. Constitution to its
broadest interpretation led to the expiration of the U.S. Federal Assault Weapons Ban (AWB)
in 2004. Lax gun regulations, just across the border, allowed Mexican DTOs to purchase semi-
automatic weapons more easily (Chicoine, 2011; Dube et al., 2013). Second, after 2006, there was
a dramatic shift in net cocaine supply from Colombia, provoked by increasing seizure efforts from
the Colombian government (Castillo et al., 2014). Less total output in a market with an inelastic
demand translated into higher rents for DTOs. The absence of property rights over these additional
rents induced DTOs to exert violence as means of appropriation (Castillo et al., 2014).
3.1.2 Joint Operations and Local Enforcement Coordination
In response to increasing drug-trafficking activity, President Felipe Calderon took the decision of
combating DTOs, using the Mexican Army. Specifically, the main goal of the military policy was
to capture the most-wanted drug-lords. In total, the Mexican Army killed or captured 26 of the 37
targets during the Mexican Drug War.
However, instead of discouraging criminal activity, the military strategy caused a “hydra ef-
fect,” attributable to the organizational structure of DTOs. In stark contrast to Colombian cartels,
Mexican DTOs organized internally within cells, rather than as a vertical hierarchy.65 Once the
Army removed the central management of DTOs, cells within and across DTOs fought for the
control of assets. Consequently, the number of DTOs went from six to 16 in a matter of five years
(Guerrero, 2011).
At the beginning of the Mexican Drug War, the military strategy also sought to maintain coop-
eration with local enforcement institutions (e.g. state and municipal). Hence, military operations
65The main functions of the drug-lords were to coordinate all cells as franchises across trafficking-routes, and to
maintain contracts with foreign supplier of cocaine and ephedrine.
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became known as “joint operations” (JOs). In total, President Calderon launched JOs in 11 dif-
ferent states.66
Ultimately, politics became a factor for cooperation, mainly because of trust issues. Munic-
ipalities governed by PAN, President’s Calderon political party, experienced greater cooperation
than municipalities governed by PRI (or PRD). Although at first this translated into higher rates
of violence for PAN-governed municipalities, empirical evidence shows “a diversion of drug traf-
fic” away from PAN-governed municipalities (Dell, 2011). Hence, shifting some of the violence
towards non-PAN-governed municipalities.
Worse yet, President Calderon dismantled many local enforcement institutions, and did not
maintain political operators in raided municipalities governed by non-PAN. As a result, violence
and chaos remained in non-PAN-governed municipalities for longer periods of time. A comparison
often drawn by President Calderon, himself, was between Tijuana and Juarez, two border urban
municipalities. Whereas the former municipality was governed by PAN, the latter municipality
maintained a PRI mayor in office. Not surprising, President Calderon claimed “success” for his
military strategy in Tijuana, whereas Juarez became the most violent city in the world during the
Mexican Drug War (Associate Press, 2010).67
Provided the organizational structure of DTOs and the lack of political operators across the
country, the military policy resulted in a counterproductive strategy. Figure 3.1 shows how drug-
related homicide rates (solid and dashed lines) spiked tremendously after the launching of the
Mexican Drug War (shaded area). Namely, rates rose from five drug-related homicides per 100,000
inhabitants, in 2006, to 16 drug-related homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, in 2012. Although for-
eign factors like net cocaine supply (lines with circles) also contributed to the spike in violence,
empirical evidence suggest that the military strategy (droplines with crosses) was the main driver
66Some of these JOs occurred at the very beginning of the sexenium term, in 2007 (e.g. Baja California, Guerrero,
and Michocan); some others in the middle of the administration, in 2008 (e.g. Chihuahua, Durango, Nuevo Leon,
Sinaloa, and Tamaulipas); and the rest towards the very end of Calderon’s presidency, in 2011 and 2012 (e.g. Coahuila,
Morelos, and Veracruz).
67Specifically, Calderon said that "[i]n [...] Juarez, unfortunately, there has not been the same degree of collaboration
and constructive attitude that we have found in other places, like Tijuana. [...] Instead of everyone working together,
they [PRI] preferred the easy way out by blaming everything on the federal government [PAN] and the president"
(Associate Press, 2010).
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Figure 3.1: Evolution of Drug-Related Homicides
of the shock. Using a variety of methodologies (e.g. propensity score matching, regression dis-
continuity designs, and synthetic control methods), the existing literature finds a marginal effect
of the Mexican Drug War on drug-related homicide rates between 46.9% and 52.4% (Dell, 2011;
Merino, 2011; Calderon et al., 2012).
3.2 Empirical Strategy
3.2.1 Methodology
The primary objective of this chapter is to assess whether drug-related violence had an impact on
depression among adults during the Mexican Drug War. To achieve the goal of this chapter, the
empirical design consists in comparing aggregate mental health outcomes at the municipality level
before and after the spike in drug-related homicide rates; hereinafter, pre-treatment and treatment
period. Given the two-period empirical design of this chapter, the central model is an equation in
first-differences:68
4Ym = α+β4T Lm + γ4Xm +4εm, (3.1)
where4Ym is the change in depression outcomes between the pre-treatment and treatment pe-
68The first-differences estimator is identical to the within-estimator in the two-period case of the fixed-effects model.
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riod, in municipality m;4T Lm is the first difference in the lag values of yearly drug-related homicide
rates between the pre-treatment and treatment period, for each municipality;4Xm are fluctuations
in observable municipality characteristics; and 4εm is the error term. The main parameter of in-
terest, the average treatment effect (ATE) of drug-related homicide rates on depression, is β . I use
ordinary least squares (OLS) to compute the magnitude and standard errors of the ATE in equation
(3.1).
Notwithstanding the advantages of first-differences regressions over cross-sectional analysis,
equation (3.1) does not necessarily capture the true treatment effect because changes in depres-
sion and drug-related homicide rates could be caused by a third dynamic variable. For instance,
recent literature contests a significant shift in migration patterns, motivated by drug-related vi-
olence. Specifically, Rios (2013) finds a gap of over 264,000 individuals, nationwide, between
the population census and the demographic forecast by Mexico’s Population Agency (CONAPO)
for 2010. Based on records from the American Community Survey, Areceo-Gomez (2013) also
suggests a new wave of wealthy well-educated Mexicans leaving the country as a consequence of
drug-related violence. Using longitudinal survey data (MXFLS), Velasquez (2014) further predicts
selective internal and international migration among self-employed men and single women living
in troubled areas.
Insofar as migration occurs more frequently among those individuals with mental health dis-
tress, equation (3.1) provides a lower-bound of the ATE because Cov
(4T Lm ,4εm) ≤ 0. Con-
versely, if depressed individuals are less likely to migrate because of their mental health condition,
then equation (3.1) provides an upper-bound of the ATE because Cov
(4T Lm ,4εm)≥ 0. I address
this migration endogeneity problem by introducing two instrumental variables: 1) the interaction
of net cocaine supply from Colombia and the presence of a drug trafficking route (DTR) in a mu-
nicipality, and 2) the interaction of a non-PAN-governed municipality dummy and the launching
of a JO in any given state. As discussed in Section 1, the first instrument is inversely correlated
to drug-related homicide rates (more net cocaine supply leads to less violence,) whereas the latter
instrument is positively correlated with drug-related homicide rates (less enforcement coordination
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and the hydra effect lead to more violence.) Although hardly testable, it is unlike for both of these
instruments to affect depression, other than through more drug-related violence.
Therefore, so long as the aforementioned instrumental variables are strong and exogenous, I
am able to estimate the true effect of drug-related homicide rates on depression by conducting
two-stage least squares (2SLS) in the first-differences model above:
4Ym = α+β4T Lm + γ4Xm +4εm
4T Lm = αF +pi4ZLm + γF4Xm +4εFm ,
(3.2)
where the first stage (F) incorporates the vector4ZLm, which contains the first difference in the
lag values of both instrumental variables.69 To control for non-linearity, I include a second-order
polynomial of drug-related homicide rates in equation (3.1) and (3.2), for some of the specifica-
tions. Finally, following the medical and economics literature, I present estimations by gender
(Piccinelli and Wilkinson, 2000).
3.2.2 Data
To measure aggregate depression among adults, I use the National Health and Nutrition Survey
(ENSANUT) for 2006 and 2012, the only available waves.70 This repeated cross-sectional survey
provides a timely framework to estimate the full effect of drug-related homicide rates on depression
at the municipality level. Namely, I consider the 2006-wave as the pre-treatment period, whereas
the 2012-wave serves as the treatment period (see Figure 3.1.)
ENSANUT contains four variables to capture the prevalence of depression among individuals
older than 19 years of age. The first variable is a dummy for clinical depression (ever in lifetime);71
the second variable is measure for “having felt sad for several days in the last week”; the third vari-
able is an indicator for “currently feeling depressed”; and the fourth variable captures whether an
69Under the standard exclusion restriction: Cov
(4ZLm,4εm | 4Xm)= 0.
70Mexico’s Ministry of Health began collecting ENSANUT in October of the preceding year (2005 and 2011), and
concluded all survey gathering in May of the base year.
71Diagnosis by a medical professional.
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individual is “currently taking antidepressants”. Additionally, ENSANUT provides several socio-
economic indicators like crime victimization, ethnicity, education, health insured status, and labor
outcomes.
The size of the cross-sectional samples are 45,240 and 46,277 adults for 2006 and 2012, re-
spectively. To avoid mortality selection biases, I exclude adults older than 65 years of age.72 What
is more, given the aggregate level of the empirical analysis, I only keep observations for individu-
als living in municipalities that appear in both waves. The previous selection reduces the sample
to 29,990 adults for 2006, and to 33,103 adults for 2012. After collapsing mental health outcomes
and socio-economic information by municipality, the sample becomes a panel of 368 municipali-
ties.73 Although the number of municipalities in the sample represents a tiny fraction for the more
than 2,450 municipalities in Mexico, these 368 municipalities amasses over two-thirds of the total
Mexican population.
To determine drug-related homicide rates at the municipality level, I utilize Mexico’s Mortality
Databases from the Bureau of Health Statistics (SINAIS). These databases contain the universe
of homicides for the period 1998-2012, along with detail information about the method of killing
and the crime scene. I employ murders caused by gunshots, decapitations, and hangings as prox-
ies for drug-related homicides. As shown in Figure 3.1, records from SINAIS move parallel to
the officially identified drug-related homicide rates from the Mexican Intelligence Agencies. One
disadvantage of official data for drug-related homicides is that these are only available from De-
cember, 2006 to September, 2011; thus missing the pre-treatment period. Consequently, I conduct
my analysis using SINAIS data, exclusively.
To build cocain net supply data, as part of the identified instrumental variables, I gather in-
formation for cocaine production and cocaine confiscation in Colombia from the United Nations
World Drug Report and Colombia’s Ministry of Defense, accordingly. Net cocain supply data is
available from 2000 to 2011. To assign DTR dummies across municipalities, I employ records of
72Older population accounts for 11% of the surveyed adult population.
73On average, the number of surveyed adults per municipality, by gender is 37.21 observations for males and
48.51 observations for females, for each of the survey waves. Consequently, there is more precision in municipality
estimations for females than for males.
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drug-shipment confiscations from Mexico’s Ministry of Defense, for the period 2007-2011. Last,
CIDAC’s electoral database distinguishes municipalities where non-PAN mayors hold office, for
the immediate electoral year that precedes the implementation of JOs.
3.2.3 Descriptive Statistics and Sources of Exogeneity
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics (Means) of Municipalities by Gender
Means at the Municipality Level†
Females Males
Pre-Treat Treat Pre-Treat Treat
(2006) (2012) (2006) (2012)
Treatment Lag Drug-Related Homicide Rates‡ 4.51 17.60 4.51 17.60
Outcomes Clinical Depression (Ever in Lifetime) 16.90 16.53 5.12 5.80
Sad for Several Days (Last Week) 40.78 46.69 22.33 28.20
Currently Feeling Depressed 14.31 17.38 8.29 6.50
Currently Taking Antidepressants 2.54 2.83 0.76 0.87
Covariates Victim of Crime (Last 12 Months) 1.29 2.91 2.29 3.66
Population Growth? 1.36 1.27 1.36 1.27
Average Age 38.45 39.97 38.74 39.71
Indigenous (Speaking) Population 4.27 4.03 4.08 3.85
Health Insured 54.51 78.46 53.63 71.38
Instruments Lag Cocaine Supply x DTR‡ 374.93 139.90 374.93 139.90
Joint Operations x Non-PAN-Governed‡ 0 0.23 0 0.23
† Means are weighted by inverse population weights. N=368. ‡Pooled average at the municipality level.
Table 3.1 contains the average values of the treatment indicator, mental health outcomes, socio-
economic covariates, and instrumental variables by gender and time period. Immediately notice-
able is the differences in mental health outcomes across gender groups. In conformity with the
existing literature, females report higher rates of depression than males for both time periods (Pic-
cinelli and Wilkinson, 2000).
Across treatment periods, depression seems to increase for almost all proxies of depression.
Similarly, crime victimization rates expand during the treatment period, although not nearly as
much as drug-related homicide rates. The previous implies that, during the peak of the conflict,
DTOs internalized the bulk of drug-related violence, directly.
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Demographic covariates show a declining growth in population size, an aging adult population,
and less indigenous (speaking) Mexicans across time, for both genders. Also, health insured rates
rise dramatically after the 2007 expansion of “Seguro Popular,” an universal health care program
for disadvantaged households. This expansion in health insured rates is much greater for females
than for males.
Table 3.2: Pre-Treatment Statistics by Instrument’s Compliance Groups
Panel A. Pre-Treatment (2006) Difference in Means by Presence of a DTR: T-Tests
Females Males
DTR No DTR Difference DTR No DTR Difference
Lag Drug-Rel. Homicide Rates‡ 4.58 4.33 0.24 4.58 4.33 0.24
Clinical Depression (Ever in Life) 16.11 19.10 -2.99 5.11 5.13 -0.02
Sad for Several Days (Last Week) 41.28 39.37 1.91 23.11 20.16 2.95
Currently Feeling Depressed 14.55 13.66 0.89 8.71 7.10 1.61
Currently Taking Antidepressants 2.90 1.54 1.36*** 0.79 0.69 0.10
Victim of Crime (Last Year) 1.37 1.09 0.28 2.13 2.75 -0.61
Population Growth 1.57 0.76 0.81*** 1.57 0.76 0.81***
Average Age 38.56 38.17 0.39 38.65 38.98 -0.33
Indigenous (Speaking) Population 4.06 4.87 -0.81 3.87 4.68 -0.81
Health Insured 56.17 49.83 6.34** 54.99 49.80 5.19**
Lag Cocaine Supply x DTR‡ 508.45 0.00 508.45*** 508.45 0.00 508.45***
Panel B. Pre-Treatment (2006) Difference in Means by Non-PAN-Governed with a JO: T-Tests
Females Males
Non-PAN PAN or Non-PAN PAN or
x JO no JO Difference x JO no JO Difference
Lag Drug-Rel. Homicide Rates‡ 6.03 4.05 1.98 6.03 4.05 1.98
Clinical Depression (Ever in Life) 12.90 18.12 -5.22*** 4.47 5.32 -0.85
Sad for Several Days (Last Week) 38.80 41.39 -2.59 22.06 22.41 -0.35
Currently Feeling Depressed 12.84 14.77 -1.93 8.75 8.15 0.60
Currently Taking Antidepressants 2.25 2.63 -0.38 0.57 0.82 -0.25
Victim of Crime (Last Year) 1.06 1.37 -0.31 1.85 2.43 -0.58
Population Growth 1.48 1.32 0.16 1.48 1.32 0.16
Average Age 38.47 38.45 0.02 38.93 38.68 0.25
Indigenous (Speaking) Population 1.89 5.00 -3.11*** 2.01 4.72 -2.71***
Health Insured 58.28 53.35 49.94* 57.35 52.48 4.87*
Lag Cocaine Supply x DTR‡ 488.47 340.08 148.39*** 488.47 340.08 148.39***
†Means are weighted by inverse population weights. Difference in means contain robust standard errors. N=368.
‡Pooled average at the municipality level. Connotations *, **, and *** mean significantly different from zero at the
90p, 95p, and 99p confidence level.
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Finally, both instrumental variables move in accordance with the identification theory. In par-
ticular, during the treatment period, there is less net cocaine supply from Colombia and less en-
forcement coordination through the implementation of JOs in non-PAN-governed municipalities.
Still, Table 3.1 does not test for instrumental exogeneity.
To verify the validity of the instrumental variables, Table 3.2 reproduces the previous statistics
for the pre-treatment period, by instrument’s complaince groups. The top panel presents statistics
by the presence of a DTR across municipalities; while the bottom panel shows statistics by non-
PAN-governed municipalities with a JO. The columns of interest in Table 3.2 contain the t-test
difference in means between complaince groups.
Table 3.2 presents three crucial results for the identification strategy. First and most impor-
tant, pre-treatment drug-related homicide rates (in-bold) are statistically indistinguishable between
compliance groups, for both instruments. This result is the main source of exogeneity. Second,
prior to treatment, mental health outcomes are practically the same, even though there might be
a possible trend for females taking antidepressants in municipalities with a DTR. Third and last,
compliers for both instruments have a smaller indigenous population (usually poor), and a bigger
formal economy, approximated by health insured rates before the expansion of “Seguro Popular.”
3.3 Preliminary Results
3.3.1 Clinical Depression
In Table 3.3, I present the main results for the effect of drug-related homicide rates on clinical
depression (ever in lifetime) among adults. Columns 1 to 4 show estimations for females, while
columns 4 to 8 present effects for males. The first two columns for each gender group correspond to
linear estimations, whereas the last two columns for each gender group incorporate a second-order
polynomial of drug-related homicide rates.
A rapid inspection of the main results suggests a significant linear effect of drug-related vio-
lence on clinical depression among females. In stark contrast, Mexican men are largely unaffected
by drug-related violence as far as clinical depression concerns. Hence, I describe the different
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specifications of Table 3.3 for females, exclusively.
Table 3.3: Average Effect of Drug-Related Violence on Clinical Depression (Ever in Lifetime)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
D Homicide 0.032* 0.097* 0.065 0.485 0.009 -0.035 0.062 -0.741
(0.017) (0.057) (0.066) (0.834) (0.015) (0.036) (0.050) (0.628)
D Homicide Sqr. -0.000 -0.004 -0.000 0.007
(0.000) (0.008) (0.000) (0.007)
Joint Significance [1.61] [1.75] [0.89] [1.88]
Joint P-Value 0.201 0.417 0.412 0.391
FIRST-STAGE
D Cocaine x DTR -0.023*** -1.426** -0.022*** -1.453***
(0.006) (0.545) (0.006) (0.532)
D non-PAN x JO 27.221*** 2920.781* 27.253*** 2919.909*
(9.455) (1519.394) (9.243) (1489.024)
Gender Female Female Female Female Male Male Male Male
R-squared 0.092 0.068 0.093 -0.038 0.039 0.012 0.044 -1.493
Municipalities 368 368 368 368 368 368 368 368
F-Stat Excluded 13.9 0.9 13.6 0.8
Chi-p: OLS-2SLS 0.145 0.320 0.227 0.096
Notes: All regressions contain robust standard errors in parentheses. Estimations factored by population weig-
hts. Joint test for non-linear models correspond to F-stats (OLS) and Chi-square stast (2SLS). Controls include
first-differences in victimization, population growth, average age, indigenous population, and health insured
rates by municipality. Connotations *, **, and *** mean significant at the 90p, 95p and 99p confidence level.
According to the OLS model in column 1, an one-standard deviation in the difference of yearly
lagged drug-related homicide rates between pre-treatment and treatment period —or 34.9 drug-
related homicides per 100,000 inhabitants— causes an enlargement of 1.0% on the proportion of
females who report clinical depression. Relative to the pre-treatment mean of clinical depression
for women, the ATE is equal to 5.9%. Said effect is statistically significant at the 90% level of
confidence.
On the other hand, the 2SLS model in column 2 shows an effect three-times the size of the OLS
model. This implies an absolute impact on clinical depression equal to 3.3% for every additional
one-standard deviation expansion of yearly lagged drug-related homicide rates between treatment
periods. Provided that the effect for the 2SLS model is also statistically distinguishable from zero,
the lower-bound bias hypothesis on migration among clinically depressed women appears to be
true.74 However, statistically speaking, the p-value of the difference in magnitudes between the
74I present coefficients and F-statistics for the first-stage of the 2SLS estimator. Based on a large F-statistic for
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OLS model and 2SLS model is not different from zero. Therefore, the results for the OLS model
are preferable to the 2SLS model.
Regarding a non-linear relationship between drug-related violence and clinical depression among
women, the joint significance test indicates a null effect. This is true across estimators. As a caveat,
in columns 4 and 8, I only present the first stage for the squared value of drug-related homicide
rates because the first stage for the linear value of drug-related homicide rates is exactly the same
as in columns 2 and 6.75
3.3.2 Current Depression by Severity
Notwithstanding the relevance of the results for clinical depression, these estimations could miss
the bigger picture for two reasons. First and foremost, the indicator for clinical depression does
not inform whether the depression diagnosis by a medical professional occurred in the recent past.
Second, not every person considers depression to be a serious or curable health problem, particu-
larly in a developing country like Mexico. In fact, data suggest that a large portion of depressed
Mexicans do not have a medical assessment of their mental health condition (Belló et al., 2005).76
Fortunately, both waves of ENSANUT contain proxies for current depression at various levels
of severity. Specifically, the indicator for “having felt sad for several days in the last week” serves
as a proxy for current mild depression; the measure for “currently feeling depressed” approximates
current moderate depression; while the dummy variable for “currently taking antidepressants”
represents current severe depression. As a caveat, the following results for current depression
should be considered as mere approximations, because these findings are not based on a medically
approved method of assessment like the Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale.
Table 3.4 conducts the same regressions as before, but for current depression among adults, and
by severity. In particular, Table 3.4 contains three panels: the dependent variable in the top panel is
mild depression; the outcome in the middle panel is moderate depression; while the results in the
excluded variables, I can say that the instrumental variables are strong predictors of drug-related homicide rates.
75The F-statistic for excluded variables drops significantly when the model is exactly identified.
76In Mexico, the percentage of depressed women without a medical diagnosis is 72.8%, while the proportion of
undiagnosed depressed males is 81.0% (Belló et al., 2005).
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bottom panel are for severe depression. For the sake of brevity, I omit the first-stage of the 2SLS
estimator, which is identical to one presented in Table 3.3. Yet, the layout in Table 3.4 corresponds
exactly to the same specifications as in Table 3.3.
In line with the results for clinical depression, males do not indicate any significant effect of
drug-related homicide rates on current depression. What is more, females continue to report a
significant enlargement in current depression as a consequence of drug-related violence. Thus,
once again, I limit the subsequent discussion to current depression among females.
According the top panel of Table 3.4, the ATE of an additional one-standard deviation expan-
sion in yearly lagged drug-related homicide rates on mild depression is equal to 1.8%. Moreover,
there is little change in the treatment effect between the OLS and 2SLS models, implying no mi-
gration among mildly depressed women. Nonetheless, in contrast to the OLS model, the 2SLS
model is not statistically different from zero. Based on the p-value of the joint significance test in
the OLS model, in column 3, these results on mild depression hold after introducing a second-order
polynomial of drug-related homicide rates, even though the coefficient for this latter term is equal
to zero.
The middle panel of Table 3.4 shows a very similar enlargement in the proportion of moderately
depressed women vis-à-vis clinical depression. Specifically, the OLS model in column 1 predicts a
1.2% increase in moderate depression among females for every additional one-standard deviation
expansion in drug-related homicide rates. Most remarkable, the 2SLS model threefolds the effect
for the OLS estimator, just as in the case of clinical depression. However, once again, there is
no statistically significant difference between the magnitudes of the OLS model and the 2SLS
model. Both linear specifications for moderate current depression among women are statistically
significant at the 90% and 95% level of confidence. These findings remain constant in the non-
linear specification for the OLS model.
Finally, the bottom panel of Table 3.3 reveals zero changes in the proportion of women who
currently take antidepressants during the treatment period. These results on severe current de-
pression for women are somehow contradictory to the linear results for clinical depression and
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mild-to-moderate current depression. However, this could be an indication for a limited effect of
drug-related violence on current depression among women.
Table 3.4: Average Effect of Drug-Related Violence on Current Depression
Panel A. Dependent Variable: Sad for Several Days (Last Week).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
D Homicide 0.048** 0.030 0.021 -1.112 0.001 -0.056 -0.111 -1.630
(0.020) (0.063) (0.086) (0.855) (0.027) (0.075) (0.092) (1.149)
D Homicide Sqr. 0.000 0.011 0.001 0.015
(0.001) (0.009) (0.001) (0.013)
Joint Significance [6.57] [1.83] [2.28] [2.68]
Joint P-Value 0.002 0.400 0.104 0.262
Gender Female Female Female Female Male Male Male Male
R-squared 0.262 0.261 0.262 -0.506 0.166 0.157 0.255 -0.995
Municipalities 368 368 368 368 368 368 368 368
Chi-p: OLS-2SLS 0.895 0.282 0.544 0.309
Panel B. Dependent Variable: Currently Feeling Depressed.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
D Homicide 0.035** 0.090* 0.128** -0.127 0.002 -0.021 -0.020 -0.275
(0.017) (0.052) (0.060) (0.532) (0.012) (0.038) (0.043) (0.519)
D Homicide Sqr. -0.001* 0.002 0.000 0.002
(0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.005)
Joint Significance [2.62] [1.28] [.6] [.37]
Joint P-Value 0.074 0.526 0.552 0.832
Gender Female Female Female Female Male Male Male Male
R-squared 0.143 0.124 0.150 -0.012 0.093 0.086 0.093 -0.040
Municipalities 368 368 368 368 368 368 368 368
Chi-p: OLS-2SLS 0.143 0.441 0.519 0.750
Panel C. Dependent Variable: Currently Taking Antidepressants.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
D Homicide 0.009 -0.006 0.027 -0.297 0.004 -0.010 0.023 -0.296
(0.007) (0.017) (0.023) (0.242) (0.005) (0.013) (0.016) (0.239)
D Homicide Sqr. -0.000 0.003 -0.000 0.003
(0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.003)
Joint Significance [.98] [1.76] [1.02] [1.89]
Joint P-Value 0.375 0.415 0.360 0.389
Gender Female Female Female Female Male Male Male Male
R-squared 0.067 0.058 0.069 -0.734 0.022 -0.001 0.028 -2.137
Municipalities 368 368 368 368 368 368 368 368
Chi-p: OLS-2SLS 0.380 0.176 0.496 0.124
Notes: All regressions contain robust standard errors in parentheses. Estimations factored by
population weights. Joint test for non-linear models correspond to F-stats (OLS) and Chi-
square stast (2SLS). Controls include first-differences in mean victimization, population
growth, average age, indigenous population, and health insured rates by municipality.
Connotations *, **, and *** mean significant at the 90p, 95p and 99p confidence level.
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To verify that this is the case, I use suicide rates as an alternative proxy for severe depression.
SINAIS provides the universe of suicides from 1998 to 2012. As mentioned previously, SINAIS
also contains information for all drug-related homicides, for the same time period. Therefore, the
number of time periods available for this proxy is much greater than in the previous analysis, which
only allows for first-differences. Consequently, I run a t-period fixed-effects regression of suicide
rates on drug-related homicide rates.77 For consistency purposes, I also conduct the following
analysis using OLS and 2SLS models; however, for brevity, I limit my results to linear effects,
exclusively.
Table 3.5: Average Effect of Drug-Related Violence on Suicide
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS 2SLS OLS OLS 2SLS
L Drug Homicide Rate -0.001 -0.001 0.003 -0.002 -0.001 -0.007
(0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.011)
Gender Female Female Female Male Male Male
Linear Time Trends No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
R-squared 0.010 0.014 0.010 0.009 0.019 0.017
Municipalities 2453 2453 2453 2453 2453 2453
Observations 34342 34342 29436 34342 34342 29436
1stg: L Cocaine x DTR -0.011*** -0.011***
(.002) (.002)
1stg: L Non-Pan Mayor x JO 12.267* 12.267*
(6.831) (6.831)
F-Stat for Excluded Var. 13.2 13.2
Notes: All regressions contain robust standard errors, clustered by municipality, in parentheses.
Estimations factored by population weights. Pre-treatment mean suicide rates are 0.30 per
100,000 inhabitans for women and 2.05 per 100,000 inhabitants for men. Connotations *, **,
and *** mean significant at the 90p, 95p and 99p confidence level.
Table 3.5 indicates a null effect of drug-related homicides on suicide rates across gender groups.
These results imply that, indeed, the spike in violence had a limited effect on current depression,
bringing confidence to the proxies for current depression and all of the results above. Finally,
77Specifically, the t-period fixed-effects model is as follows:
Ymt = βT Lmt + γXmt +δm +αt + εmt ,
where Y is yearly suicide rates at the municipality level, in period t;, T L is the lag value of drug-related homicides at
the municipality level, in period t; X is a vector of municipality time-varying observables, δ is a full set of municipality
dummies that controls for time-invariant unobservables, α is a matrix of year dummies that captures common shocks
across municipalities, and ε are all other time-varying unobservables that influence suicide rates. For this regression,
I use the within-estimator of the fixed-effects model.
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as the number of time periods increases, the F-statistic for excluded variables remains practically
unchanged.
3.4 Robustness Test
To evaluate the sensitivity and validity of the findings above, I conduct five robustness tests. First,
I perform a non-parametric analysis, using the Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale
(CES-D), available only for the 2012-wave of ENSANUT. Based on a host of medically approved
questions, CES-D computes a depression score that runs from zero to 21, in which higher values
indicate more severe depression. In particular, I run a first-order local polynomial smoothing
regression of individual CES-D scores on municipality lagged drug-related homicide rates, by
gender.78
Figure 3.2 presents graphically the non-parametric results for individuals that live in munici-
palities with drug-related homicide rates below an one-standard deviation expansion over the pre-
treatment mean (e.g. 39.41 drug-related homicides per 100,000 inhabitants).79 The left-hand side
panel contains results for females, whereas the right-hand side panel shows findings for males. In
line with the results above, females report higher CES-D scores than males.
For females, the CES-D score line increases constantly all throughout the horizontal axis, be-
coming slightly steeper around extreme values of drug-related homicide rates. Conversely, the
CES-D score line for males is basically flat along the x-axis, corroborating the results in Tables
3.3 and 3.4. This check presumes a robust linear causal relationship of drug-related homicides on
depression among females, in its rawest sense.
Second, I verify the robustness of the linear 2SLS model by dropping one of the instruments,
for each of the outcomes in Table 3.3 and 3.4. Table C.1 in the Appendix section include the
results of this robustness check. The top panel tests the instrumental validity for the interaction of
net cocaine supply from Colombia and the presence of a DTR in a municipality, while the bottom
78This locally weighted OLS contains an Epanechnikov kernel and optimized bandwidths.
79Over 90% of the surveyed adult population live in municipalities with a drug-related homicide rates below the
aforementioned threshold.
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Figure 3.2: Relationship between Drug-Related Homicide Rates and CES-D for the Treatment
Period
panel does so for the interaction of a non-PAN governed municipality and the launching of a JO in
a given state.
In the case of clinical depression among women, the linear 2SLS model continues to be much
higher than the OLS estimator, after dropping one of the instrumental variables. Similarly, mod-
erate current depression for females also shows the same behavior. Conversely, the linear 2SLS
model for mild and severe current depression among females are not robust to the exclusion of
one of the instrumental variables. However, the linear 2SLS model for both of these outcomes, in
females, are not statistically significant. Most important, both instrumental variables continue to
report a large F-statistic value, separately.
The last three robustness tests consists of including additional covariates, applying a fake out-
of-synch treatment, and using official records of drug-related homicides from the Mexican Intel-
ligence Agencies, instead of SINAIS data. To conduct this last robustness test, I assume official
drug-related homicides to be zero during the pre-treatment period, which is missing. Table C.2
in the Appendix section contains the results for all three robustness checks. Each of the panels in
Table C.2 contains one robustness test for the linear OLS model.
The top panel reports coefficients that are robust to the inclusion of a host of covariates (e.g. ed-
ucation levels, prevalence of chronic diseases, labor outcomes, and recent accidents,) even though
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some statistical power is lost for clinical depression among females. The middle panel confirms the
nature of this natural experiment by regressing drug-related homicides that are out-of-synch, and
which do not correspond to the spike in drug-related violence (e.g. five years earlier). Finally, the
bottom panel indicates very similar results when using official records of drug-related homicides
from the Mexican Intelligence Agencies, instead of SINAIS data.
3.5 Conclusion
Preliminary findings in this chapter suggest a statistically significant increase of 1.0% in clinical
depression among women for every one-standard deviation expansion in yearly lagged drug-related
homicide rates, after the beginning of the Mexican Drug War. Also, drug-related homicides seem
to have a very similar impact on self-assessed mild-to-moderate depression among women vis-à-
vis clinical depression. In stark contrast, Mexican men appear largely unaffected by drug-related
violence. These results are robust to a variety of specifications, falsification tests, and data sources
of drug-related homicides. However, additional research into the mechanisms that create differen-
tial effects for females and males is needed. Future versions of this paper will seek to find these
gender differential mechanisms.
The economics consequences of a higher depression prevalence in the adult population are nu-
merous. For instance, there are immediate effects on labor supply (Michaelsen, 2012). Moreover,
depression can lead to a series of intrafamily problems, ultimately being reflected back into the
social fabric. Hence, an extrapolation to all possible economic consequences could easily indicate
slower economic development in Mexico because of the absence of the rule of law, and the social
conditions to maintain citizens free of fear.
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A APPENDIX OF CHAPTER 1 (THE EFFECT OF OPOR-
TUNIDADES ON REPORTING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
TO THE POLICE)
Table A.1: July-December 2005 Monthly Transfer for Oportunidades
Scholarship (MXN) Level Grade Boy Girl
3rd 115 115




Middle 8th 355 390
9th 370 430
10th 560 645
High 11th 605 685
12th 640 730
Food Grant (MXN) = 170 (MXN)
Max per family with children in 3th-9th = 1045 (MXN)
Max per family with children in 10th-12th = 1775 (MXN)








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A.3: Changes in Beneficiary Population: Exclusion of women who begin experiencing IPV
after receiving Oportunidades
Exclusion of women Exclusion of women
Covariate No Yes Diff. Covariate No Yes Diff.
Community>14999 0.16 0.17 0.01 Free-Union 0.26 0.27 0.01
Mun. Empower. 0.49 0.49 0 Years cohabiting 20.93 21.12 0.19*
Mun. Develop. 0.71 0.71 0 Predicted Puntaje 1.84 1.83 -0.01
Indigenous woman 0.24 0.24 0 Asset index -1.27 -1.26 0.01
Indigenous men 0.24 0.24 0 Dirt floor 0.33 0.32 -0.01
Age 40.7 40.79 0.09 Drainage 0.71 0.72 0.01
No schooling 0.23 0.23 0 Crowding index 2.45 2.46 0.01
Primary Incomplete 0.4 0.4 0 Wage 1.9 1.91 0.01
Primary Complete 0.2 0.2 0 Family member harmed 0 0 0
Secondary 0.16 0.16 0 Seriously Harmed 0.14 0.14 0
>Secondary 0.02 0.01 -0.01 Harmed 0.38 0.4 0.02
Children<11y. 0.69 0.69 0 Hospitalized 0.2 0.2 0
Family size 5.21 5.23 0.02 IPV Frequency 0.23 0.23 0
Divorced 0.07 0.07 0 Childhood IPV 0.56 0.57 0.01
Notes: Means are weighted by inverse survey sampling weights. Difference in means are clustered
at the municipality level. Connotations *, **, and *** mean significantlydifferent from zero at the
90 p., 95 p. and 99 p.
Table A.4: IPV and Reporting IPV rates for Beneficiary and Non-beneficiary Women
Pre-treatment Post-treatment
Sample Non-Ben. Benef. Non-Ben. Benef. Diff-in-Diff
All 0.253 0.250 0.266 0.268 0.005***
(0.125) (0.108) (0.129) (0.113) (0.000)
(S-) Rural 0.208 0.228 0.225 0.248 0.003***
(0.115) (0.108) (0.123) (0.116) (0.001)
(S-) Urban 0.331 0.354 0.337 0.363 0.002**
(0.129) (0.122) (0.132) (0.125) (0.001)
Notes: Means are weighted by inverse survey sampling weights. Differ-
ence in means are clustered at the municipality level. Connotations *,**,
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A.7: Confounding Effects: Specialized IPV Laws for Pooled Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Probit Probit Probit Biprobit 2SLS Biprobit 2SLS Biprobit 2SLS
Oportunidades 0.038* 0.042** 0.042** 0.031* 0.147 0.039*** 0.223* 0.040** 0.207
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.138) (0.015) (0.134) (0.016) (0.134)
IPV-Law time 0.003 0.004* 0.005** 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.005*
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003)
Instruments No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Muni. controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demo. controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
IPV controls No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Puntaje-Assets No No Yes No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 3444 3444 3444 3444 3444 3444 3444 3444 3444
Municipalities 776 776 776 776 776 776 776 776 776
GOF p-stat 0.000 0.000 0.000
Overidentif. 0.293 0.399 0.392
Endogeneity 0.489 0.200 0.243
F-stat IV 9.84 9.66 9.70
Redundacy 0.018 0.019 0.016
Marginal effects
Notes: Regressions contain robust standard errors, clustered by municipalities, in parentheses. Excluded instrumen-
tal variables are the rollout in the densification process and the ratio of IMSS-Oportunidades over health providers.
Murphy’s goodness-of-fit score tests for excess kurtosis in the errors. The Hansen J statistic reports a test of over-
identifying restrictions. The C statistic presents the result of the Hausman endogeneity test. Redundancy is an LM
test for an invalid IV. Connotations *, **, and *** mean significantly different from zero at the 90 p., 95 p. and 99 p.
Table A.8: Confounding Effects: Specialized IPV Laws for Rural Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Probit Probit Probit Biprobit 2SLS Biprobit 2SLS Biprobit 2SLS
Oportunidades 0.007 0.011 0.013 0.041 -0.051 0.055* 0.066 0.049 0.046
(0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.033) (0.230) (0.029) (0.235) (0.037) (0.227)
IPV-Law time 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Instruments No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Muni. controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demo. controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
IPV controls No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Puntaje-Assets No No Yes No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 1920 1920 1920 1920 1920 1920 1920 1920 1920
Municipalities 627 627 627 627 627 627 627 627 627
GOF p-stat 0.000 0.000 0.000
Endogeneity 0.803 0.814 0.883
F-stat IV 6.79 6.64 7.44
Marginal effects
Notes: Regressions contain robust standard errors, clustered by municipalities, in parentheses. Excluded instrumental
variable is the ratio of IMSS over health providers. Murphy’s goodness-of-fit score tests for excess kurtosis in the err-
ors. The Hansen J statistic reports a test of overidentifying restrictions. The C statistic presents the result of the Haus-
man endogeneity test. Connotations *, **, and *** mean significantly different from zero at the 90 p., 95 p. and 99 p.
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Table A.9: Confounding Effects: Specialized IPV Laws for Urban Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Probit Probit Probit Biprobit 2SLS Biprobit 2SLS Biprobit 2SLS
Oportunidades 0.125*** 0.118*** 0.112*** 0.040*** 0.574 0.043** 0.769 0.048** 0.769
(0.040) (0.037) (0.038) (0.013) (0.539) (0.019) (0.547) (0.023) (0.574)
IPV-Law time 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.006) (0.001) (0.006) (0.001) (0.006)
Instruments No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Muni. controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demo. controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
IPV controls No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Puntaje-Assets No No Yes No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 1524 1524 1524 1524 1524 1524 1524 1524 1524
Municipalities 283 283 283 283 283 283 283 283 283
GOF p-stat 0.000 0.000 0.000
Endogeneity 0.351 0.145 0.161
F-stat IV 3.20 3.11 2.98
Marginal effects
Notes: Regressions contain robust standard errors, clustered by municipalities, in parentheses. Excluded instrumental
variable is the rollout in the densification process. Murphy’s goodness-of-fit score tests for excess kurtosis in the err-
ors. The Hansen J statistic reports a test of overidentifying restrictions. The C statistic presents the result of the Haus-
man endogeneity test. Connotations *, **, and *** mean significantly different from zero at the 90 p., 95 p. and 99 p.
Table A.10: Additional Covariates for Pooled Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Probit Probit Probit Biprobit 2SLS Biprobit 2SLS Biprobit 2SLS
Oportunidades 0.040** 0.044** 0.043** 0.033* 0.160 0.041*** 0.213* 0.043*** 0.190
(0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.139) (0.014) (0.129) (0.015) (0.125)
Instruments No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Muni. controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demo. controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
IPV controls No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Puntaje-Assets No No Yes No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 3444 3444 3444 3444 3444 3444 3444 3444 3444
Municipalities 776 776 776 776 776 776 776 776 776
GOF p-stat 0.000 0.000 0.000
Overidentif. 0.228 0.293 0.299
Endogeneity 0.500 0.232 0.282
F-stat IV 9.86 9.96 10.39
Redundacy 0.017 0.017 0.012
Marginal effects
Notes: Regressions contain robust standard errors, clustered by municipalities, in parentheses. Excluded instrumen-
tal variables are the rollout in the densification process and the ratio of IMSS-Oportunidades over health providers.
Murphy’s goodness-of-fit score tests for excess kurtosis in the errors. The Hansen J statistic reports a test of over-
identifying restrictions. The C statistic presents the result of the Hausman endogeneity test. Redundancy is an LM
test for an invalid IV. Connotations *, **, and *** mean significantly different from zero at the 90 p., 95 p. and 99 p.
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Table A.11: Additional Covariates for Rural Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Probit Probit Probit Biprobit 2SLS Biprobit 2SLS Biprobit 2SLS
Oportunidades 0.008 0.014 0.016 0.039 -0.046 0.047 0.080 0.040 0.063
(0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.035) (0.226) (0.031) (0.236) (0.045) (0.225)
Instruments No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Muni. controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demo. controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
IPV controls No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Puntaje-Assets No No Yes No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 1920 1920 1920 1920 1920 1920 1920 1920 1920
Municipalities 627 627 627 627 627 627 627 627 627
GOF p-stat 0.000 0.000 0.000
Endogeneity 0.813 0.774 0.828
F-stat IV 6.56 6.18 7.25
Marginal effects
Notes: Regressions contain robust standard errors, clustered by municipalities, in parentheses. Excluded instrumental
variable is the ratio of IMSS over health providers. Murphy’s goodness-of-fit score tests for excess kurtosis in the err-
ors. The Hansen J statistic reports a test of overidentifying restrictions. The C statistic presents the result of the Haus-
man endogeneity test. Connotations *, **, and *** mean significantly different from zero at the 90 p., 95 p. and 99 p.
Table A.12: Additional Covariates for Urban Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Probit Probit Probit Biprobit 2SLS Biprobit 2SLS Biprobit 2SLS
Oportunidades 0.119*** 0.115*** 0.111*** 0.037* 0.516 0.043** 0.736 0.053** 0.785
(0.038) (0.035) (0.035) (0.022) (0.750) (0.022) (0.704) (0.026) (0.812)
Instruments No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Muni. controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demo. controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
IPV controls No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Puntaje-Assets No No Yes No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 1524 1524 1524 1524 1524 1524 1524 1524 1524
Municipalities 283 283 283 283 283 283 283 283 283
GOF p-stat 0.000 0.000 0.000
Endogeneity 0.570 0.287 0.302
F-stat IV 1.81 1.91 1.63
Marginal effects
Notes: Regressions contain robust standard errors, clustered by municipalities, in parentheses. Excluded instrumental
variable is the rollout in the densification process. Murphy’s goodness-of-fit score tests for excess kurtosis in the err-
ors. The Hansen J statistic reports a test of overidentifying restrictions. The C statistic presents the result of the Haus-
man endogeneity test. Connotations *, **, and *** mean significantly different from zero at the 90 p., 95 p. and 99 p.
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Table A.13: Exclusion of the “Quasi Poor” for Pooled Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Probit Probit Probit Biprobit 2SLS Biprobit 2SLS Biprobit 2SLS
Oportunidades 0.024 0.027 0.030 0.027 0.089 0.038* 0.189 0.039 0.168
(0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.027) (0.180) (0.021) (0.169) (0.024) (0.167)
Instruments No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Muni. controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demo. controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
IPV controls No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Puntaje-Assets No No Yes No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 2651 2651 2651 2651 2651 2651 2651 2651 2651
Municipalities 720 720 720 720 720 720 720 720 720
GOF p-stat 0.000 0.000 0.000
Overidentif. 0.145 0.190 0.195
Endogeneity 0.917 0.417 0.490
F-stat IV 7.21 7.05 7.23
Redundacy 0.033 0.033 0.030
Marginal effects
Notes: Regressions contain robust standard errors, clustered by municipalities, in parentheses. Excluded instrumen-
tal variables are the rollout in the densification process and the ratio of IMSS-Oportunidades over health providers.
Murphy’s goodness-of-fit score tests for excess kurtosis in the errors. The Hansen J statistic reports a test of over-
identifying restrictions. The C statistic presents the result of the Hausman endogeneity test. Redundancy is an LM
test for an invalid IV. Connotations *, **, and *** mean significantly different from zero at the 90 p., 95 p. and 99 p.
Table A.14: Exclusion of the “Quasi Poor” for Rural Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Probit Probit Probit Biprobit 2SLS Biprobit 2SLS Biprobit 2SLS
Oportunidades -0.010 -0.006 -0.002 0.015 -0.169 0.042 -0.044 0.031 -0.062
(0.022) (0.021) (0.020) (0.053) (0.265) (0.042) (0.266) (0.065) (0.260)
Instruments No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Muni. controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demo. controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
IPV controls No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Puntaje-Assets No No Yes No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 1642 1642 1642 1642 1642 1642 1642 1642 1642
Municipalities 588 588 588 588 588 588 588 588 588
GOF p-stat 0.005 0.000 0.000
Endogeneity 0.533 0.883 0.818
F-stat IV 5.98 5.91 6.36
Marginal effects
Notes: Regressions contain robust standard errors, clustered by municipalities, in parentheses. Excluded instrumental
variable is the ratio of IMSS over health providers. Murphy’s goodness-of-fit score tests for excess kurtosis in the err-
ors. The Hansen J statistic reports a test of overidentifying restrictions. The C statistic presents the result of the Haus-
man endogeneity test. Connotations *, **, and *** mean significantly different from zero at the 90 p., 95 p. and 99 p.
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Table A.15: Exclusion of the “Quasi Poor” for Urban Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Probit Probit Probit Biprobit 2SLS Biprobit 2SLS Biprobit 2SLS
Oportunidades 0.127*** 0.117*** 0.116*** 0.049*** 0.784 0.052** 1.186 0.061 1.184
(0.048) (0.044) (0.044) (0.018) (0.960) (0.021) (1.163) (0.050) (1.222)
Instruments No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Muni. controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demo. controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
IPV controls No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Puntaje-Assets No No Yes No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 1009 1009 1009 1009 1009 1009 1009 1009 1009
Municipalities 245 245 245 245 245 245 245 245 245
GOF p-stat 0.000 0.000 0.000
Endogeneity 0.404 0.159 0.178
F-stat IV 1.66 1.55 1.37
Marginal effects
Notes: Regressions contain robust standard errors, clustered by municipalities, in parentheses. Excluded instrumental
variable is the rollout in the densification process. Murphy’s goodness-of-fit score tests for excess kurtosis in the err-
ors. The Hansen J statistic reports a test of overidentifying restrictions. The C statistic presents the result of the Haus-
man endogeneity test. Connotations *, **, and *** mean significantly different from zero at the 90 p., 95 p. and 99 p.
Table A.16: Within-Municipalities FE: Effects of Oportunidades on Reporting IPV to the Police
FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE
Oportunidades 0.074* 0.074* 0.072* 0.025 0.029 0.025 0.112 0.107 0.111
(0.041) (0.039) (0.041) (0.068) (0.057) (0.062) (0.094) (0.085) (0.091)
Muni. dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demo. controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
IPV controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Puntaje-Assets No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Sample All All All Rural Rural Rural Urban Urban Urban
Observations 2156 2156 2156 790 790 790 1183 1183 1183
Municipalities 259 259 259 163 163 163 105 105 105
R-squared
Marginal effects
Notes: All regressions contain robust standard errors, clustered by municipalities, in parentheses.
Connotations *, **, and *** mean significant at the 90 p., 95 p. and 99 p. level
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B APPENDIX OF CHAPTER 2 (THE ECONOMIC CONSE-
QUENCES OF THE MEXICAN DRUG WAR)
Table B.1: Effect of the Mexican Drug War on Drug-Related Homicide Rates for Treated States
(2007-2012)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS Fixed ABGMM
Roll x Inter Ops 77.424*** 71.545*** 102.969*** 84.906**
(21.267) (23.067) (37.343) (37.109)




L p/Homicide 0.736*** 0.756*** 0.501***
(0.163) (0.160) (0.031)
State dummies No No Yes No
Year dummies No Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.710 0.736 0.753
Number of States 11 11 11 11
Observations 66 66 66 66
Drug War ATT (Hom. Rates) 5.60 5.17 7.44 6.14
Notes: All regressions contain robust standard errors in parentheses. Connotations
*, **, and *** mean significant at the 90 p., 95 p. and 99 p. level of confidence.
Table B.2: Continuous Evidence for the Orthogonality in the Assignment of Treatment
(1) (2) (3)
OLS OLS OLS
Pre-Treatment p/GDP 0.003 0.002
(0.009) (0.009)
Pre-Treatment Corruption -0.003 -0.002
(0.017) (0.017)
R-squared 0.002 0.001 0.002
Number of States 30 30 30
Observations 30 30 30
Notes: All regressions contain robust standard errors
in parentheses. Connotations *, **, and *** mean
significant at the 90p, 95p and 99p confidence level.
Sample excludes Campeche and Tabasco.
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Table B.3: Synthetic Weights for Treated States with an Accurate Synthetic Control
Donor Pool† Chihuahua Durango Guerrero Michoacan Sinaloa
Aguascalientes 0 0.187 0 0 0
Baja California Sur 0 0 0.016 0 0.260
Chiapas 0 0 0.166 0 0
Colima 0 0 0 0 0
Distrito Federal 0.077 0 0.011 0 0.025
Guanajuato 0.323 0.088 0 0.148 0
Hidalgo 0 0 0 0 0
Jalisco 0.219 0.162 0 0 0
Mexico 0 0 0 0 0
Nayarit 0 0 0.099 0 0.520
Oaxaca 0 0 0.690 0.266 0
Puebla 0 0 0 0 0
Queretaro 0.122 0.215 0 0 0
Quintana Roo 0 0 0.018 0 0
San Luis Potosi 0 0 0 0 0
Sonora 0.259 0 0 0 0.019
Tlaxcala 0 0 0 0 0
Yucatan 0 0 0 0.319 0
Zacatecas 0 0.348 0 0.267 0.176
† Sample excludes all treated states, Campeche, and Tabasco.
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Figure B.1: GDP per Capita Gap for Treated States with an Accurate Synthetic Control
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Figure B.2: Mechanism for the Effect of the Mexican Drug War on “Risky” Consumption, for
Treated and Synthetic Control Units
93
C APPENDIX OF CHAPTER 3 (BREAKING SAD: DRUG-
RELATED HOMICIDES AND MENTAL WELL-BEING IN
MEXICO)
Table C.2: Robustness and Falisication Checks
Panel A. Additional Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Diff L Drug Homicide Rate 0.026 0.012 0.043** 0.009 0.034* 0.007 0.008 0.005
(0.018) (0.013) (0.019) (0.025) (0.020) (0.012) (0.008) (0.004)
Dependent Variable Clinical Clinical Mild Mild Moderate Moderate Severe Severe
Gender Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.170 0.150 0.356 0.296 0.214 0.183 0.168 0.092
Municipalities 368 368 368 368 368 368 368 368
Notes: All regressions contain robust standard errors in parentheses. Estimations factored by population weights.
Controls include first-difference in mean victimization, population growth, average age, indigenous population,
health insured rates, education levels, chronic diseases, labor participation, and recent accidents by municipality.
Connotations *, **, and *** mean significant at the 90p, 95p and 99p confidence level.
Panel B. Fake Treatment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Diff L Drug Homicide Rate 0.123 0.033 0.048 0.080 0.074 0.087 0.013 -0.006
(0.145) (0.106) (0.219) (0.192) (0.116) (0.122) (0.053) (0.031)
Dependent Variable Clinical Clinical Mild Mild Moderate Moderate Severe Severe
Gender Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.085 0.038 0.258 0.167 0.139 0.092 0.064 0.022
Municipalities 368 368 368 368 368 368 368 368
Notes: All regressions contain robust standard errors in parentheses. Estimations factored by population weights.
Controls include first-differences in mean victimization, population growth, average age, indigenous population, and
health insured rates by municipality. Signs *, **, and *** mean significant at the 90p, 95p and 99p confidence level.
Panel C. Official Records of Drug-Related Homicide Rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Diff L Of Drug Hom Rate 0.026* -0.001 0.043** -0.004 0.037** -0.000 0.004 0.001
(0.016) (0.012) (0.017) (0.026) (0.018) (0.012) (0.006) (0.003)
Dependent Variable Clinical Clinical Mild Mild Moderate Moderate Severe Severe
Gender Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Municipalities 368 368 368 368 368 368 368 368
Notes: All regressions contain robust standard errors in parentheses. Estimations factored by population weights.
Controls include first-differences in mean victimization, population growth, average age, indigenous population, and
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